Indra Adnan’s piece in the Huffington Post outlines the future of the Downing Street Project;

The Downing Street Project is going to shift its gaze from equal representation for women, to the much broader question of the gender dynamics of the public sphere and its effect on society… [It is hoped this will develop] a growing understanding of what the real opportunities of balanced leadership are in public life and what the benefits would be for everyone.

One comment in her article is particularly telling not just for contemporary politics, but equally contemporary Public Diplomacy:

At the moment of selection, it is those women who can demonstrate most of these macho qualities that are chosen for office. Women whose strengths might be in listening and integrating rather than performing, who have an ability to see the bigger picture over the immediate crisis, who use emotional and social intelligence as a primary tool of connecting with the people they serve – these women will be undervalued in such a political culture.

Coming just after, in Philip Seib’s words, the flimsy new framework for Strengthening U.S. Engagement with the World, the ideas Indra highlights should have a high degree of resonance. The Strategic Framework for US PD lacked any sense of a networked approach, focusing on a hierarchical framing narratives and correcting information to ‘markets’. That might work with some of the people some of the time, but at others genuine engagement will require a different mindset. A mindset focused as Indra put it – on listening and integrating rather than performing – of understanding the importance of developing and using connections rather than a strategy based on broadcast (and micro-broadcast) of information. Public Diplomacy cannot be carried out merely on the assumption that ‘the more you know us the more you will like us’ – so lets make sure you have all the ‘correct’ information and everything will be fine.

Working with people, working alongside them and working for them is going to have a greater impact with many communities than setting up the loud speaker and setting it to transmit, however well refined the message.

While the emphasis on evaluation was a positive – that evaluation must be meaningful – not another round of half-hearted self justification. It will need to get to grips with using network analysis and data mapping, to provide those on the ground with useful and easily interpreted information alongside providing insight into how to gain benefit from engaging with different communities or networks.

This presentation, part of the the International Seminar On Network Theory, discusses approaches to measuring benefit from a network alongside measuring cost of exclusion from a network. (Thanks Intermap for the link) The argument demonstrates that those excluded from a network (either physically or because their behaviour fails to engage network members) suffer costs while members reap rewards. With this, and numerous other insights into the advantages a networked approach can bring, it makes little sense to focus almost exclusively on information, message and framing – effectively opting to exclude oneself from many networks – and incurring the resultant costs.

This starts with being able to give individuals an overview of the shape of a network, and the key connections;

But it also includes being able to map data in other ways, for example the changing attitudes toward the US.

Pew Global Attitdes – Changing Favourability to the US 2002 – 2009

(Click link to go to time-series version)

The Pew Global Attitudes Project bears no responsibility for the analyses or interpretations of the data presented here.

Or, returning us to the theme of gender and balanced leadership, the data from the WEF Gender Gap report

Map of WEF Gender Gap Data

(Click link to go to time-series version)

Ultimately Public Diplomacy is about influencing the behaviour of others, so the planning and conduct of PD should be open to those ideas most likely to influence that community – rather than focus on what the PD organisation, or their constituency, would like to be saying.

Six or seven years ago I wrote an article analysing some of different types of satirical and bad-taste images which circulated on the web following 9/11: Gramsci and the New Intellectuals

The intention was not to pass judgement on the images, but to discuss the entry of a new type of influencer – ‘the new intellectuals’  using Gramscian theory – as they took early steps in framing interpretations of and responses to significant international events. Taking advantage of low cost communication, these ‘new intellectuals’ engaged with an international audience, in a way that Public Diplomacy organisations couldn’t then, and many would still struggle now.

Circulating false information, these ‘intellectuals’ influenced large numbers of individuals to search for and discuss ideas – one favourite being that Nostrodamus predicted 9/11. While I have my reservations about the use of the phrase  ’many to many’ and what it really means in PD2.0, (it brushes over the degree of complexity and understanding of networks required to achieve serious results) these interactions fit within the ideas of influence through ‘many to many’.

Ok some of the links are now broken, and it was before the growth in social  networking, or  Twitter, and five years before PD2.0 was widely discussed but I wondered – are some of the ideas still useful?

The run-in to the Christmas break has seen the production of numerous pieces about Gov 2.0 and PD 2.0. As comments on them have got a little long I’ve attached them here rather than have an overly long blog post.

Many of these have been hot on the potential of ‘new’ tools but less clear on what they think the  ’network’ in social networks might mean and how this would influence the development of strategy. If PD 2.0 is to make serious progress attention will have to be given to understanding the networks with which PD engages, not just the tools through which that engagement takes place.

What does this video have to do with it? It is based on understanding what is likely to influence behaviour, rather than just the tools.

Ultimately, understanding different types of networks with which PD 2.0 will engage is an important part of developing strategy and understanding what does ‘many to many’ mean?

A quick map to demonstrate the variety of indivdiuals Tweeting through #16Azar to 11:08 GMT. Larger spheres are the hours, smaller ones the contributers. Interestingly a large number of individuals have only been active for one or two hours, with relatively few near the middle of the map active over a longer period of time.

Quick and rough look at Tweets using #16Azar as protests continue in Tehran.

Growing volume over the last week:

Today (to 11am GMT)

The rising volume of tweets during the day – 296 to 8174

Rising active users during the day – 85 to 261 per hour (active users counted as those who tweet in that hour).

Of those active in the 7th December data, there is a long tail of people contributing a few tweets. Highest user has contributed 607 tweets by 11am GMT.

at least 60% Tweets are using RT

Following on from the data posted on the USC Public Diplomacy blog, a few people asked why not include #IranElection – the answer was twofold, first it had so much more traffic it would have dwarfed the others, making distinctions harder to identify. Second, the level of traffic limited the extent to which a user could keep up with the flow of information from #IranElection. at its peak the #tag was running at over 22,500 tweets an hour and nearly 100,000 tweets in a day. There is little anyone can get from reading 375 tweets a minute, forcing users to rely on filters such as the more specific tags, or choosing only to follow certain users; narrowing the field of view but having a chance to understand what is being produced.

Continuing on from that post, and with a nod of thanks @jobrieniii for the work on Twapperkeeper, I have looked at the data from #IranElection for 10 weeks following the election.

The following images chart the usage of #IranElection and shows 1.4 million tweets spread out over that time.

I wouldn’t quite say I’ve got all of the bugs out of the data,so consider these ‘draft’, but they give a good idea of how usage has varied with time.

Below is the comparison of #Neda and #GR88 usage over a slightly later time period. A further observation form the data is that the top two contributors to #neda have used the tag over 4,000 times each.

The image below, backing up the initial observation in the USC post that users of #HelpIranElection were isolated from other discussions, demonstrates the longevity – or should that be brevity – of usage this #tag had amongst users.

While still vaguely active in October, Tweets a day had barely been in double figures for quite some time. Actual interaction through this tag was also much lower; 78% of tweets carrying #HelpIranElection were identical.

The average tweets per user suggests a similar story. For example, in the case of #FreeIran the average tweets per user was 15.4, #Sohrab it was 11.99 while #HelpIranElection was used on average 1.09 times. This is the difference between ‘click to show your support’ of #HelpIranElection and genuine interaction.

Will update further soon.

While the enthusiasm for using digital media to engage with individuals around the world shows little sign of abating, interestingly the enthusiasm for discussing hard data about those interactions seems to be lagging behind.

While not every Public Diplomat need nor can be expected to have a detailed knowledge of vast spreadsheets with numerous columns and thousands of rows of data, there should be a clear understanding of the trends. Numerous sites provide some of that data for example Twitter Analyzer , TweetStats , TwitterCounter and Trendsmap among many others. Whichever method is used, key to success is understanding the people who are following what they are saying, after all how meaningful an interaction can occur otherwise?

Building on earlier pieces analyzing and mapping America.gov followers on Twitter, it seemed only fair to have a look at Dipnote’s over 9,000 followers. So who follows Dipnote on Twitter & where are they?

This is a cloud of the most common words appearing in the screen-names of those following Dipnote. While it appears there are a lot of people called David following Dipnote, this doesn’t tell us much except confirm that we can identify all the followers individually.

More important than their chosen screen-names is the geographic location of followers. Looking at the users who identify their location can give an idea of the geographic spread of the followers. While there is no guarantee the individuals are anywhere near where they say they are, it might be assumed that a large portion of users volunteering the information are doing so to give an indication of their location.

Similar to America.gov, the most common locations are predominantly in the USA, and specifically Washington DC – I’ll leave it to others to draw conclusions from that.

There are numerous other aspects of the data which could be analyzed, one of which is the profile of these followers? What are the most common things they choose to say about themselves?

This shows the most common words in the profiles of the 9000 followers. Another aspect is that these followers in turn have an average of 2810 followers of their own (although this is likely skewed by a few very high values, e.g. one user has 42,000 followers)  While clouds of screen-names might be a little frivolous, being able to quickly identify common values from 9,500 rows of data can significantly increase the understanding of followers. It can highlight factors which might have serious implications on tactical and strategic decision making about the use of digital media.

As a final thought, what has Dipnote been tweeting about recently?

These images demonstrate there is no need to operate in the dark; the data is out there. The onus must be on those directing Public Diplomats to use digital media to also ensure data is available in a format which those on the frontline can easily understand.

All images in this post were produced using http://www.wordle.net

Matt Armstrong a while back highlighted the issue that America.gov had more followers listing their location as in America, than they did followers from the rest of the world.

I mapped the data he collected to demonstrate how the location of those followers could be broken down by region.  By way of an update, here’s an alternative map of the same data.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9FIS1cBpqXA]

please forgive the colours, they aren’t exactly the same as in the original, but I hope you’ll still get the idea.

Does it matter in Public Diplomacy terms if an organisation with which you partner is heavily criticised in an official report? This post continues from an earlier post on the British Council’s partnership with weapons manufacturer BAE Systems.

The earlier post focused on the  considerations which must exist alongside the potential benefits of partnership in Public Diplomacy. Specifically, the need to identify those things an organisation will not give up at any price.

In this instance the financial support for British Council programmes provided by BAE systems may have brought with it certain risks to reputation, beyond the possible conflict some may feel exists when a cultural relations organisation, working to increase international understanding and bridge trust gaps in order to create harmony and prosperity for all, partners with a weapons manufacturer. The reputation of the organisation could be at risk as its partner  BAE Systems faces prosecution over bribery allegations.

In addition, the independent review of the 2006 RAF Nimrod crash that killed 14 military personnel has delivered a damning verdict. Among those heavily criticised in the report were BAE Systems.  The full report was so damning of BAE that I’ve included some of the longer sections below as abbreviation does not do them justice:

• The Nimrod Safety Case was drawn up between 2001 and 2005 by BAE Systems [working with the MOD and QinetiQ]
• The Nimrod Safety Case represented the best opportunity to capture the serious design flaws in the Nimrod which had lain dormant for years. If the Nimrod Safety Case had been drawn up with proper skill, care and attention, the catastrophic fire risks to the Nimrod MR2 fleet presented by the Cross-Feed/SCP duct and the Air-to-Air Refuelling modification would have been identified and dealt with, and the loss of XV230 in September 2006 would have been avoided.
• Unfortunately, the Nimrod Safety Case was a lamentable job from start to finish. … BAE Systems bears substantial responsibility for the failure of the Nimrod Safety Case.
• [The Safety Case was] riddled with errors of fact, analysis and risk categorisation.
• BAE Systems designed, manufactured and installed both the SCP duct and the AAR capability for the Nimrod, but failed properly to understand or assess the risks inherent in their designs and modifications
• Further, at handover meetings in 2004, BAE Systems gave the misleading impression to the Nimrod IPT and QinetiQ that the task had been properly completed and could be signed off and deliberately did not disclose to its customer the scale of the hazards it had left “Open” and “Unclassified” (many with only vague recommendations that ‘further work’ was required). The Nimrod IPT and QinetiQ representatives were lulled into a false sense of security. These matters raised question marks about the prevailing ethical culture at BAE Systems.

In contrast, the ‘Training Bridge‘ project run by the British Council and in which BAE Systems participates seeks to

promote lasting UK – German co-operation in the field of work-based training. Participating in the programme is a means to share best business practice while giving trainees and trainers new skills that can be easily applied back in the workplace.

The reality of Public Diplomacy partnerships, whether through the ‘Training Bridge’, UKIERI in India, or exchange programes in Saudi Arabia, is that the large financial resources of corporations such as BAE Systems can increase the reach and impact a Public Diplomacy organisation can achieve. However, these organisations also have their own agenda, methods and organisational culture. As the British Council website notes many of our business partners gain competitive advantage… from these partnerships.

The question for a Public Diplomacy organisation partnering or recieving sponsorship must be whether the increased impact is worth certain other risks.

This leads ultimately to the same conclusion as the previous post on this issue, an organisation must identify things which are not for sale – asking the question posed at the British Council Advisory Board 2007;

• What should we not give up at any price?

High on the list has to be credibility, without which the ability to engage in meaningful interaction with members of other communities and societies will be severely curtailed.