Following on from the data posted on the USC Public Diplomacy blog, a few people asked why not include #IranElection – the answer was twofold, first it had so much more traffic it would have dwarfed the others, making distinctions harder to identify. Second, the level of traffic limited the extent to which a user could keep up with the flow of information from #IranElection. at its peak the #tag was running at over 22,500 tweets an hour and nearly 100,000 tweets in a day. There is little anyone can get from reading 375 tweets a minute, forcing users to rely on filters such as the more specific tags, or choosing only to follow certain users; narrowing the field of view but having a chance to understand what is being produced.

Continuing on from that post, and with a nod of thanks @jobrieniii for the work on Twapperkeeper, I have looked at the data from #IranElection for 10 weeks following the election.

The following images chart the usage of #IranElection and shows 1.4 million tweets spread out over that time.

I wouldn’t quite say I’ve got all of the bugs out of the data,so consider these ‘draft’, but they give a good idea of how usage has varied with time.

Below is the comparison of #Neda and #GR88 usage over a slightly later time period. A further observation form the data is that the top two contributors to #neda have used the tag over 4,000 times each.

The image below, backing up the initial observation in the USC post that users of #HelpIranElection were isolated from other discussions, demonstrates the longevity – or should that be brevity – of usage this #tag had amongst users.

While still vaguely active in October, Tweets a day had barely been in double figures for quite some time. Actual interaction through this tag was also much lower; 78% of tweets carrying #HelpIranElection were identical.

The average tweets per user suggests a similar story. For example, in the case of #FreeIran the average tweets per user was 15.4, #Sohrab it was 11.99 while #HelpIranElection was used on average 1.09 times. This is the difference between ‘click to show your support’ of #HelpIranElection and genuine interaction.

Will update further soon.

While the enthusiasm for using digital media to engage with individuals around the world shows little sign of abating, interestingly the enthusiasm for discussing hard data about those interactions seems to be lagging behind.

While not every Public Diplomat need nor can be expected to have a detailed knowledge of vast spreadsheets with numerous columns and thousands of rows of data, there should be a clear understanding of the trends. Numerous sites provide some of that data for example Twitter Analyzer , TweetStats , TwitterCounter and Trendsmap among many others. Whichever method is used, key to success is understanding the people who are following what they are saying, after all how meaningful an interaction can occur otherwise?

Building on earlier pieces analyzing and mapping America.gov followers on Twitter, it seemed only fair to have a look at Dipnote’s over 9,000 followers. So who follows Dipnote on Twitter & where are they?

This is a cloud of the most common words appearing in the screen-names of those following Dipnote. While it appears there are a lot of people called David following Dipnote, this doesn’t tell us much except confirm that we can identify all the followers individually.

More important than their chosen screen-names is the geographic location of followers. Looking at the users who identify their location can give an idea of the geographic spread of the followers. While there is no guarantee the individuals are anywhere near where they say they are, it might be assumed that a large portion of users volunteering the information are doing so to give an indication of their location.

Similar to America.gov, the most common locations are predominantly in the USA, and specifically Washington DC – I’ll leave it to others to draw conclusions from that.

There are numerous other aspects of the data which could be analyzed, one of which is the profile of these followers? What are the most common things they choose to say about themselves?

This shows the most common words in the profiles of the 9000 followers. Another aspect is that these followers in turn have an average of 2810 followers of their own (although this is likely skewed by a few very high values, e.g. one user has 42,000 followers)  While clouds of screen-names might be a little frivolous, being able to quickly identify common values from 9,500 rows of data can significantly increase the understanding of followers. It can highlight factors which might have serious implications on tactical and strategic decision making about the use of digital media.

As a final thought, what has Dipnote been tweeting about recently?

These images demonstrate there is no need to operate in the dark; the data is out there. The onus must be on those directing Public Diplomats to use digital media to also ensure data is available in a format which those on the frontline can easily understand.

All images in this post were produced using http://www.wordle.net

Matt Armstrong a while back highlighted the issue that America.gov had more followers listing their location as in America, than they did followers from the rest of the world.

I mapped the data he collected to demonstrate how the location of those followers could be broken down by region.  By way of an update, here’s an alternative map of the same data.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9FIS1cBpqXA]

please forgive the colours, they aren’t exactly the same as in the original, but I hope you’ll still get the idea.

Does it matter in Public Diplomacy terms if an organisation with which you partner is heavily criticised in an official report? This post continues from an earlier post on the British Council’s partnership with weapons manufacturer BAE Systems.

The earlier post focused on the  considerations which must exist alongside the potential benefits of partnership in Public Diplomacy. Specifically, the need to identify those things an organisation will not give up at any price.

In this instance the financial support for British Council programmes provided by BAE systems may have brought with it certain risks to reputation, beyond the possible conflict some may feel exists when a cultural relations organisation, working to increase international understanding and bridge trust gaps in order to create harmony and prosperity for all, partners with a weapons manufacturer. The reputation of the organisation could be at risk as its partner  BAE Systems faces prosecution over bribery allegations.

In addition, the independent review of the 2006 RAF Nimrod crash that killed 14 military personnel has delivered a damning verdict. Among those heavily criticised in the report were BAE Systems.  The full report was so damning of BAE that I’ve included some of the longer sections below as abbreviation does not do them justice:

• The Nimrod Safety Case was drawn up between 2001 and 2005 by BAE Systems [working with the MOD and QinetiQ]
• The Nimrod Safety Case represented the best opportunity to capture the serious design flaws in the Nimrod which had lain dormant for years. If the Nimrod Safety Case had been drawn up with proper skill, care and attention, the catastrophic fire risks to the Nimrod MR2 fleet presented by the Cross-Feed/SCP duct and the Air-to-Air Refuelling modification would have been identified and dealt with, and the loss of XV230 in September 2006 would have been avoided.
• Unfortunately, the Nimrod Safety Case was a lamentable job from start to finish. … BAE Systems bears substantial responsibility for the failure of the Nimrod Safety Case.
• [The Safety Case was] riddled with errors of fact, analysis and risk categorisation.
• BAE Systems designed, manufactured and installed both the SCP duct and the AAR capability for the Nimrod, but failed properly to understand or assess the risks inherent in their designs and modifications
• Further, at handover meetings in 2004, BAE Systems gave the misleading impression to the Nimrod IPT and QinetiQ that the task had been properly completed and could be signed off and deliberately did not disclose to its customer the scale of the hazards it had left “Open” and “Unclassified” (many with only vague recommendations that ‘further work’ was required). The Nimrod IPT and QinetiQ representatives were lulled into a false sense of security. These matters raised question marks about the prevailing ethical culture at BAE Systems.

In contrast, the ‘Training Bridge‘ project run by the British Council and in which BAE Systems participates seeks to

promote lasting UK – German co-operation in the field of work-based training. Participating in the programme is a means to share best business practice while giving trainees and trainers new skills that can be easily applied back in the workplace.

The reality of Public Diplomacy partnerships, whether through the ‘Training Bridge’, UKIERI in India, or exchange programes in Saudi Arabia, is that the large financial resources of corporations such as BAE Systems can increase the reach and impact a Public Diplomacy organisation can achieve. However, these organisations also have their own agenda, methods and organisational culture. As the British Council website notes many of our business partners gain competitive advantage… from these partnerships.

The question for a Public Diplomacy organisation partnering or recieving sponsorship must be whether the increased impact is worth certain other risks.

This leads ultimately to the same conclusion as the previous post on this issue, an organisation must identify things which are not for sale – asking the question posed at the British Council Advisory Board 2007;

• What should we not give up at any price?

High on the list has to be credibility, without which the ability to engage in meaningful interaction with members of other communities and societies will be severely curtailed.

Quick look at 3D network map.

This one of followers of FCO accounts on Twitter, will follow-up with further data.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GzxMBl3KSZo]

Understanding importance or influence within a network depends in part on perspective; both the way you look at it and what your priorities are. The ability to view the map in 3D is all about understanding the network from its different perspectives.

We live in a networked world. Whether known as family, kinship, tribe, village, neighbourhood, community, work place colleagues, or online social network, they are all networks in the sense of being a series of relationships between different individuals.

Social network analysis (SNA) explores the relationship between actors within a network by identifying the points that people “huddle around”. The potential uses of SNA and network mapping are vast. It can be used to plan, develop and evaluate engagement for, among other purposes, public diplomacy and strategic communication.

This piece provides and introduction and demonstrates how it can be used to evaluate interaction on Twitter through the example of Dipnote and Americagov. Read in full

The response by individuals using Twitter to the Iranian election provides important perspectives for the scholarship and practice of Public Diplomacy.

The ability to map and analyze the interaction between Twitter accounts can provide a greater understanding of the response to a specific event, in this case the Iranian election, in a way not possible in narrative accounts. This same technique of mapping tweets also provides the potential to understand opportunities in conducting and evaluating PD 2.0

Analysis of Twitter usage following the Iranian election demonstrates that if Public Diplomacy 2.0 or digital diplomacy is to be truly successful – the ability to understand the actual interactions of social media users will have to become central to the planning and evaluation of programmes and initiatives.

Read full text on USC Center on Public Diplomacy Blog

The current vogue for conducting Public Diplomacy through ‘partnerships’ and the movement in theory on collaborative / collective action can create some difficult challenges in practice.

For those who conduct Public Diplomacy in partnership with BAE Systems, the announcement that BAE Systems faces prosecution over bribery allegations, while as yet unproven, creates awkward questions. This comes just over a year after a separate investigation into BAE by the SFO was dropped in 2007 after it was decided that national security was at risk.

One such organisation working in partnership with BAE is the British Council, who places amongst its organisational values:

Integrity

We demonstrate this by

• being honest
• being consistent both in what we do and say
• taking responsibility for our actions and decisions.

The British Council has been running programmes in partnership with BAE Systems for almost 20 years. Although the allegations of corruption are unproven, they may still undermine the British Council’s commitment to increase international understanding and bridge trust gaps in order to create harmony and prosperity for all.

Partnerships with BAE have included the Post-doctoral Summer Research (PDSR) Programme in Saudi Arabia. The British Council website acknowledges that The programme is supported by BAE Systems, the major British company with overall responsibility for the Al-Yamamah programme. The Programme has been sponsored from its inception in 1991 by BAE Systems and administered by the British Council.

The Al-Yamamah arms deal with Saudi Arabia has been the focus of a guardian investigation and an SFO investigation which the UK Government controversially halted in 2006. Tony Blair argued at the time that he believed an ongoing investigation would lead to complete wreckage of a relationship that is of fundamental importance of the security of this country and that the investigation would lead absolutely nowhere.

BAE Systems is also a corporate partner of the UK India Education and Research Initiative UKIERI. Martin Davidson (British Council CEO) identified in his introduction to the British Council Annual Report 07/08 that one way to increase impact is to run more programmes in partnership with others. For example UKIERI is a unique programme involving 11 funding partners. UKIERI is run with corporate partners BAE Systems, BP, GlaxoSmithKline and Shell. Martin Davidson concludes If we are to achieve our growth objectives, we recognise that we need to increase our ability to develop successful partnerships such as UKIERI

Partnership with the British Council is advertised on their website as helping many of our business partners gain competitive advantage in an increasingly challenging global market place … many companies also welcome the opportunity to work with us as a way of underlining their company values and commitment to corporate social responsibility.

The example of the partnership between BAE Systems and the British Council demonstrates the real risk which Public Diplomacy organisations can face in expanding their engagement in partnerships. Ironically, it was the British Council’s advisory board meeting in 2007 The Meaning of Partnership which posed many of the pertinent points for consideration when any PD organisation begins to consider partnership.

• What might be the greatest gains we can have from strong partnerships?
• What risks will we need to manage when making larger, more strategic partnerships?
• How can we ready ourselves to mitigate risk and gain the most from this new direction?
• What will we have to consider losing along the way…at what price?

And the final, and most salient question

• What should we not give up at any price?

Matt Armstrong posed this question on Mountainrunner. The coding of the data he had gathered was crowdsourced via twitter. This has allowed him to run an analysis of the global audience of a government initiative run on a social media application.

The result of his analysis demonstrates that 67% – 70% of the audience is a demographic the organisation is not supposed to target. In numbers terms, 982 of the nearly 2000 individuals for which there was data, self-identified their location as in the United States. Further data available on Mountainrunner.

This data provides a number of further points to consider, two of which are;

a)      Location and nationality is not the same thing; though with no evidence either way an assumption on random distribution of citizens and visitors would indicate many individuals are likely to be US citizens.

b)      What does the distribution of users look like, what are the common nodes within the network, both within the US and outside?

To start the process of visualising the network of individuals engaged in this initiative I’ve mapped the network using the coded data provided my Matt and his helpers.

This map & a higher resolution version of the map are available in png format, (may display better in Safari).

The lines on the map demonstrate how the individuals connect to particular locations and which continent that location belongs to. The dots identify the individuals their location as they defined it, and the relevant geographic area or continent. This allows clusters to identified around locations and comparison to be drawn between the audience in each geographic region.

As a number of individuals chose not to register a location, preferring ‘the blue planet’, ‘Earth’, or ‘the world’ these have all been grouped together.

This map is a fairly basic version of what these techniques can achieve; commentary on the map and how this can also be used to demonstrate or evaluate  a Public Diplomacy organisation’s engagement with different themes within social media will follow shortly.

The evaluation of Government 2.0 initiatives using a network analysis approach, has demonstrated the importance of understanding the type of the network which is being engaged through social media. The value of consciously considering whether the initiative will be centralised around Government or dispersed throughout society should not be overlooked. This may unlock the potential of new ways of working including Open Source Public Diplomacy.

On Friday Canada House hosted Gov2Gov, an event presented by the Social Media Club and FutureGov Consultancy to discuss;

the changing nature of civic engagement and the relationships between citizens and their government, in which social media tools and the emergent ideals of Government 2.0 can be harnessed for better cross boundary collaboration and service to our citizens.

Joanne Jacobs was liveblogging at the event and comments via twitter #g2g give a feel for this very interesting event. Having taken part in this discussion about the future use of social media by governmental organisations I wanted to record some of my thoughts about the relationship between understanding networks and Government 2.0.

The potential governmental use of social media is inextricably linked to understanding of the network with which they seek to engage or that they seek to create.

The shift in ethos from that adopted through traditional channels of engagement to that most likely needed to use social media was a common theme of the discussion. A number of speakers emphasised the ability to listen to the voices of their constituency or to engage in dialogue through social medial.

This potential for listening and dialogue has the potential to empower collective action or collaboration on policy. To realise this potential, in line with the often discussed ethos of social media, governmental organisations will have to understand the form of network in which they are engaged. If they do not, experience demonstrates that the governmental approach to social media will adopt a centralised view of the network, where they act as if the universe revolves around them. 

Thinking of government existing in a walled garden and using social media to invite audiences into an area they control is a limited and centralised view of the network. Being able to reach out into the areas around which communities coordinate, thinking of Governmental engagement with networks as decentralised or dispersed along side the centralised option, has the potential to make communication more effective. The view of genuine collaborative engagement and collective action via social media will become increasingly important as the governmental walled gardens that exist in the physical world are increasingly surrounded by anti-ram barriers and police with automatic weapons. 

An example offered by Stephen Hale demonstrated the importance of understanding the difference between the centralised approach and collective action in a dispersed or decentralised network. The description of an engagement via Facebook described as leading to discussions with ministers prompted me to ask ‘what changed on the policy side as a result of your initiative and opportunity to engage in dialogue with ministers? The answer appeared to be nothing; policy remained the same as a result of this dialogue and it did not appear the intention had ever been to shift policy position on the basis of this dialogue (of the deaf). Photos on Flickr, video on YouTube, a group on Facebook, do not necessarily mean that social media is being used for dialogue or collective action. Government 2.0 will just be Gov 1 in new clothes if social media is used purely in this narrow centralised form. 

Another example discussed at Gov2Gov, Exchanges Connect also emphasised a centralised understanding of the government position in relation to the networks with which governments engage.  The aim of Exchanges Connect is to create an international social network to allow participants of exchanges to communicate, collaborate, connect.

 Though created using Ning, this initiative requires individuals to go to a centralised site, rather than embedding this exchange within the tools they use regularly. In essence participants must come to and area administered by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, rather than the State Dept. going to the points around which participants coordinate. Whether this matters really depends on the audience and type of engagement and organisation is aiming for, but looking at the site this morning there are 194 members of the ‘Fulbright Group’.

 Keep in mind; The Fulbright Program operates in more than 155 countries and has provided over 285,000 participants — chosen for their academic merit and leadership potential — with the opportunity to study, teach and conduct research in each others’ countries and exchange ideas.  Approximately 7,000 grants are awarded annually.

 The centralised approach appears to create a gap between reference in rhetoric to social media and even open source ethos and many examples of engagement in practice. If the ethos is to be truly adopted this means a shift from building cathedrals to engaging with a bazaar, effectively working in a Gramscian market place of ideas. Without this shift, governmental officials will struggle to identify opportunities for genuine dialogue let alone for collaboration and collective action. This aspiration for dialogue appears regularly in the rhetoric about the use of social media by government officials but significantly less often in practice. I offered an extended argument of this point in Music for the Jilted Generation: Open Source Public Diplomacy.

 This gap between rhetoric and practice may be interpreted as officials being disingenuous, but the benefit of the doubt makes it likely it was because governments regularly misunderstand their position within the network of those engaged in social media. 

For example, hierarchies are often contrasted with networks. While there can be hierarchical and network based models of engagement, it is a mistake to think of hierarchies as something separate from networks. Hierarchies are a form of network and a method of arranging a network map within social network analysis.

So what? 2 considerations:

1) Failure to consider the type of network has a significant impact on the sustainability of the programme. This is particularly important when governmental organisations build centralised networks and subsequently stop their funding / involvement in the vain hope the network will continue working. Centralised networks from which the central hub is removed are the most likely to collapse.

 Rather than revisit much of this here, Valdis Krebs and June Holley have written a good article on sustainable networks and the importance of recognising different roles / behaviour within a network.

 2) If networks are largely considered as centralised around the governmental initiatives, there is a distinct risk that governments are missing the conversations their constituents are having about the issues that are important to them. They may also be missing opportunities to engage or increase the impact of their programmes. One illustrative example is the discussion I attended in which military organisations were concerned with getting greater video capability in the field.

 The aim was to demonstrate to communities back home what they were facing and operations they were conducting in theatre. This discussion was almost totally detached from the numerous videos soldiers had taken with their mobile phones and uploaded to various sites across the web. (This included soldiers trading video / images of combat for credits on porn sites). Looking beyond the centralised approach would have provided this discussion not only with greater options. It also would have included in the discussion those videos and images already in the public domain and which in a centralised approach were almost invisible.

 For Government 2.0 to unlock the potential of social media it will require;

• making the mental shift toward means of collaboration and cooperation,
• understanding the difference between centralised and dispersed networks,
• engaging in dialogue of the communities’ choosing in areas around which those communities coordinate.

 We must avoid conducting Government 2.0 with a web 1 mentality.