Accepting the premise that there is a gap between academics and practitioners I considered the means to create a bridge for theoretical perspectives to enter practice, and equally for the reverse to occur.

Theory and practice are currently caught in a paradox, the environment is evolving fast with new players, new providers, new tools all forming a new network. Yet, engagement and discussion are slowed by definitional arguments about the discipline and bureaucratic turf wars. Reading some of the resulting definitions it is are hard to differentiate what PD methods could be used under that definition and which could not, as a result I argued that there is a need to look past definitional arguments to focus on the shared purpose – influencing behaviour – and through the shared focus discuss, share and exchange methodological insights.

Online engagement is one means for exchange, practitioners and academics engage through DipNote, MountainRunner, USC’s PD Blog and John Brown’s Press and blog review among many others. Some of the links can be seen through TouchGraph which creates an image of the Google related pages database.

Approaching the gap between theory and practice from a network perspective it is clear that individuals are needed to act as a physical bridge between academics and practitioners. However, a bridge is fine but will do little by itself; there needs to be something to go across the gap.

For academics to influence the world of practice, should they chose to do try, their approach might be to consider how they can engage in R&D for tools which meet the immediate challenges of the practitioner, while embodying the theoretical perspective the academic seeks to promote.

In effect, as I argue in the presentation, the gap between theory and practice might bridged to some extent by better Networked R&D.

New tech is changing the face of engaging with foreign populations, whether you’d like to call it PD 2.0 or not. Craig Hayden‘s post on CPD blog raises some important questions in this area and one of the key questions for different organisations will be through which of the spaces, platforms or technologies should they seek to engage? This however, is only half the question – the other half is not just being ‘on YouTube’ or ‘having a blog’ or even ‘tweeting’, how can the tech be used to its full potential, and which bit of tech is being used for what purpose?

Serious answers to these will help organisations avoid appearing like the drunken uncle dancing in cringe-worthy fashion at a wedding.  

The recent DipNote use of Twitter, has drawn comment from Enduring America along with wider comments on DipNote coming from Mountainrunner. Ok its not perfect and a good conclusion is one which Mountainrunner writes about DipNote “this really isn’t a knock on the blog, it isn’t more than half good either“. It’s not a disaster, its not a roaring success that will revolutionise PD, it is just nudging along.

This judgement however, comes with a slight caveat – it is based on what I think they want it for. That caveat relates not just my view of the State Department’s use of Twitter, if relates to all those deciding whether to use Twitter or not and by extension it could (and should) be asked whenever organisations are (were) considering Ning, Facebook, YouTube, etc or any of the next generation of spaces and technologies.

What do you want it for? What are you going to do with it?  Failure to ask these questions vastly increases the chance of using it ‘because everyone else is’. We’ve all been there at some point; there is a lot of buzz around a particular thing, then someone suggests it should be part of project x or programme y etc. next thing you know you’ve announced it and we’re off to the races there’s no getting it back now. Anyone that’s been through it knows this is a sure-fire way of appearing like the uncle at the wedding.

So it was that the already croweded infosphere was full of the news from #mumbai just before Christmas. Stories which suggested that as the attacks unfolded ‘news’ was pouring out of Mumbai last week via twitter while Journalists were coordinating informal information networks on their blackberries. Most news media covered this angle to some extent, though the revelation that NFL star receiver Plexico Burress somehow managed to shoot himself in the leg at a nightclub did run it close in some papers.

There is however, a distinct difference between the info networks run by journalists and the twitter avalanche that has particular relevance here. The networks were being run for a purpose (and received comparatively little attention), while the Twitter avalanche was just that, a lot of people sending personal communication without some overarching purpose – this was not some mass movement.

The wolfe’s den makes a useful point here; Never before has a crisis unleashed so much raw data — and so little interpretation. Equally, rumour circulated that Indian authorities asked people to stop tweeting in case it was providing the attackers with useful intelligence, yet in 100 pages Alexader Wolfe couldn’t find much of practical use.

Consider that avalanche, one article noted within five seconds at 0748 GMT, 80 messages were posted, another graphically demonstrates the speed it gathered pace. I don’t intend to discuss in depth the security implications of operating in such an environment, merely to highlight the level of buzz created stories of their own about Twitter. The numbers became the story…

This unfortunately has become the way in a number of things in Public Diplomacy, size of potential audience has been the draw not what can be done in that particular environment. The stories about the Twitter avalanche have an echo of some presentations I’ve seen over the last couple of years on the potential of new technology in public diplomacy / digital diplomacy / engagement in virtual worlds etc. Heavy on the potential, or at least potential numbers, but less so on the clarity of what is going to be done with it. Some of this to be fair may be due to the perceived (and in many cases actual) level of understanding of the audience – I’ve lost count the number of times I’ve heard “this is what World of Warcraft looks like” or “This is an avatar walking around Second Life and this is how many Avatars there are”. In these cases and that of #Mumbai, the story is the size of the involvement (or potential involvement) rather than the serious practical purpose it can serve. These technologies provide means for engagement not just an audience for a message!

I am not saying we should abandon discussion, nor that we should not be happy with having found another way of reaching an audience. I suggest that if it is just another means to deliver a message (even if it has more of a human voice than other methods), another way to ask for comment just to answer back with the same rebuttals that will also appear in other media, to take a centralised view and drive traffic to other sites or stories produced by the same organisation, it is a missed opportunity. But if that’s all you want if for then it will do the job just fine. Both DipNote and 10 Downing Street have been largely using them in this way.

These have parallels with Politicians playing half a game of tennis with 5 children from a school of 1800 students, a visit to 1 ward in a hospital treating thousands of patients a year, or perhaps a visit to the troops in the combat zone while the actual battle rages a safe distance (preferably a long way) up the road. Despite the high numbers actually involved in the general vicinity the engagement actually genuinely reaches very few, while providing a nice photo op. Image over engagement; which if that’s all that is desired then fine, but lets not discuss the size of potential size and discuss that is will reach a limited number in a cool way.

However, is there more? Sure; it could be used for coordination amongst participants at events. If PD organisations are engaged in events which are intended to promote network building then this has some serious potential (assuming that it is a technology the participants coordinate around – rather than one which has little resonance). For example, TN2020 run by the British Council attempts this – though seems to be relying on @andrewkneale at time of writing for many of the comments.

This method uses a public space by creates an introspective view, as many of the comments while public have little resonance to anyone not included in the ‘insider’ group of attendees. The deliberate channelling in this type of network building provides means for measurement and coordination while enabling network development amongst the attendees. It may even allow an invitation for outsiders to participate but it will be hard for them not to remain outsiders if physical events continue without their involvement. 

However, one may consider something like FrontlineSMS (thanks; Peter Upton) particularly if relying on a centralised network model, which provides enables instantaneous two-way communication on a large scale, largely through a central hub. OK it has not got the cool appeal of Twitter, but if phone usage within the target community is text rather than web-based, it may provide a serious alternative. It would facilitate organising; a swarm or a text vote, running a competition or providing auto-response for opening times at an information centre. It, as with much of the new tech discussion, all depends on where and with whom the organisation is working along with what they are trying to achieve.

Ultimately PD is about influencing the way people to act – tech may be one of the tools and providing information may part of the process, but the important debate is what to do through tech.

Repeating the same things through different channels, will have little success just as (as I highlighted in Options for Influence) the Cluetrain Manifesto argued companies would have to evolve their methods of engagement:

‘Most corporations, …only know how to talk in the soothing, humorless monotone of the mission statement, marketing brochure, and your-call-is-important-to-us busy signal. Same old tone, same old lies. No wonder networked markets have no respect for companies unable or unwilling to speak as they do.’

PD must evolve also not just to use the technologies these networks do, but also use them as these networks do. This will move toward the open source approach in some elements of engagement, as PD organisations evolve, Giles Scott-Smith wrote;

In place of futile attempts to control all information outlets and non-state actors, the aim has shifted more towards proposals ‘to create image and value platforms’ and ‘network relationships’ around which state and non-state actors can congregate and mobilize

To do this they may seek to engage in an open-source approach to public diplomacy

which engages in collective effort among peers (both foreign and domestic), whether they are governments, NGO, commercial enterprises, or members of a blogroll or Facebook group. In doing so it may seek to aid groups that lobby a foreign government for a change in policy but may equally aim to achieve the beneficial outcome by changing the behaviour of the population, directly irrespective of government policy or direction.

To tweet or not to tweet; the question is what are you trying to achieve?

Came across this provocative analysis of British foreign policy and instruments such as The British Council. It suggests, amidst other media comment that “what British still has in spades is cultural power”, that:

The Council’s purpose is not to extend soft power; it is to build trust, engagement, and the genuine exchange of ideas. The alternative course of action would be to drop the emphasis on genuine engagement, a partnership of equals, and mutual benefit in favour of programmes “to make others follow your will”. (11th December)

While I’m working on a network mapping post, thought I’d follow up the previous post with a useful link on fostering sustainable behavior, from the guys that wrote the book on the subject.

There have been many attempts to pin down what Public Diplomacy is about, and as I’m currently finishing editing The Trials of Public Diplomacy, this has been at the forefront of my mind. Rather than seeking another definition to encapsulate (or exclude) certain actors, methodologies, or bureaucracies, I’ve been seeking to think about what PD is it at its core.

To me it is attempting to influence behaviour to change the odds of certain outcomes occurring.   

In thinking about this I’ve revisited Michael Lewis’ Moneyball, in it he writes about how the management of the Oakland A’s broke down the entirety of a match into an encounter of each hitter facing a pitcher which became;

a miniature game in itself, in which the odds shift constantly. The odds depend on who is pitching and who is hitting, of course, but they also depend on the minute events within the event. Every plate appearance was like a hand of blackjack; the tone of it changed with each card dealt.

Moneyball p. 147

This analogy was based on the analysis of expected outcomes for a hitter, depending on where they were in the count. Paul DePodesta, working for the Oakland A’s, highlighted the shifting odds in achieving a favourable outcome, not just as a result of a ball or strike on the first pitch but importantly on every pitch.

“The difference between 1-2 and 2-1 in terms of expected outcome is just enormous” says Paul. “It’s the largest variance of expected outcomes of any one pitch. On 2-1 most average major league hitters become all-stars, yet on 1-2 they become anemic nine-hole hitters.”

Moneyball p. 147

Public diplomacy organisations should think similarly when considering the networks with which they engage. The networks are not static; each network exists as an ongoing cultural and structural negotiation where every action influences (positively or negatively) the likelihood of certain outcomes occurring in the future. To be clear; the odds of any specific outcome occurring will change with each and every interaction between the members of the network.

This is good news! A positive result can increase the chances of further positive outcomes in future. However, it is equally a cautionary note; an organisation cannot on one day have a negative impact, either due to Foreign Policy or specific personal interaction, and hope to return to a blank canvass the next.

A hitter that swings wildly and ends up 0-2 can not just ask nicely for the count to be put back to 0-0. The hitter is in a deep hole and will have to work very hard to get out of it. Likewise those conducting PD who realise their country, organisation or policy are unpopular cannot just change tack and hope that returns them to 0-0; they will have to conduct programmes which re-engage with the communities before they can then move on to attempting to achieve current policy goals through PD. This re-engagement stage cannot be missed out, by Barack Obama or anyone else.   

While much emphasis is placed on measurement and concrete outcomes, the reality is that Public Diplomacy can offer no more than influence, to change the odds of events happening. Public Diplomacy does not control people’s thoughts; it works to influence in systems with many complex and unpredictable inputs, it works with vast audiences that even with the best message testing and focus groups may interpret a PD programme in a way other than it was intended.

To return to the analogy, Public Diplomacy is about influencing a community in the attempt to make a desired behaviour more likely to occur. It is about finding ways of making it more likely the behaviour will be 2-1 and an all star idea, rather than an anemic 1-2.

Like a marathon runner turning on to the Mall in London, the US election campaign has nearly reached the finish. As in 2004 , this election cycle has demonstrated the growing importance of online engagement and highlights the potential for PD organisations seeking to target the US, as more key influencers emerge and engage on the internet. 

This engagement will require a shift in mindset to greater openness and dialogue in both planning and practise. Unfortunately, as Tommi Laitio highlighted this week Coping with the World, those that do conduct themselves with greater openness can be attacked for exactly that;

Senior foreign policy experts including some former foreign ministers are currently criticising the current minister Alexander Stubb for too much openness. Stubb allowed the daily Helsingin Sanomat to publish assesments of Finnish ambassadors on the status of world politics.

The Canadian E-discussions while not really discursive are at least an attempt at openness. They have a way to go to be considered genuine dialogue but it’s a start.

Why target the US online?

The ability of PD organisations to engage online – particularly those targetting America – matters because, recent Pew survey results and the accreditation of bloggers at the conventions, for example, have demonstrated the level of political engagement online.

The headline from; The internet and the 2008 election by Aaron Smith and Lee Rainie was that by June;

46% of Americans have used the internet to get political news and share their thoughts about the campaign. Online video and social networking sites have taken off…

Other key stats include;

• 39% of online Americans have used the internet to gain access to primary political documents and observe campaign events.

• 35% of Americans have watched online videos related to the campaign,

• 11% of Americans have contributed to the political conversation by forwarding or posting someone else’s commentary about the race.

• 10% have used social networking sites to engage in political activity (which is 40% of those who have created profiles on such sites. Two-thirds of internet users under the age of 30 have a social networking profile, and half of these use social networking sites to get or share information about politics or the campaigns).

• 8% of internet users (representing 6% of all adults) have donated money to a candidate online.

The report demonstrates, unsurprisingly, that political engagement online has increased both since 2004 election campaign and the earlier Pew survey in 2006.

This presents two interesting options -

1) what can PD organisations learn from the way these campaigns are run, what is the relationship between the integrated official elements of the campaign and the dispersed elements which enrich the campaign at a local level but are beyond centralised authority?

2) Should PD organisations (particularly those with limited financial resources) be shifting emphasis from physical world to virtual when targeting the US?

The first I fear is too large a point for this post, and I’m not really the person to provide the answer – so I’ll leave it as a question should anyone wish to venture perspectives from the campaign.

The second question however, highlights an important point I can address – the US is wide open for online engagement, both for the purpose of domestic politics and PD initiatives launched from outside the US. As the Pew report demonstrates the numbers of people who use online platforms for political activity is growing. The question is how long will it take for PD initiatives to aggressively follow suit. There are of course, those early adopters that are already busy, but for the rest, the potential for mass engagement in an online environment is still one of untapped potential. The engagement of blogger networks for example, might provide means to deliver a dispersed strategy if a PD organisation had something with which to engage them. Ultimately will they be able to find a means of engagement?

Understanding coordination games and having individuals within a PD organisation empowered to engage in the online environments would be a start. These will require greater openness, a willingness to engage, and mindset that seeks out ideas originating outside the organisation.

With Americans increasingly engaging online, those seeking to engage may value the potential which could be gained from creating PD programmes that match this trend. This will likely require a breaking down of the formal hierarchies through which MFA, and related organisations tend to operate. On a practical level individuals will also need to be able to engage at work, so social spaces, online video, skype etc. will all need to work on the computers of PD organisations. The active discouragement of this engagement at work, through blocking sites and limiting access to technology shuts off a potential (and rapidly growing) area of engagement with the American population which for most PD organisations is high on the priority list.

With the report this week that operations in Afghanistan are playing catch-up with their opponents, in the use of video on mobile phones, this gap in adoption cannot be allowed to grow in any environment. For those, for example Europeans, seeking to influence the US public The internet and the 2008 election presents clear evidence that there is potential to conduct PD with large scale audiences online. The challenge, for many, will be whether the PD organisations can adapt fast enough to empower their representatives to engage effectively in these environments?

John Worne‘s International Relations Positioning Spectrum (IRPS), and Nick Cull‘s response provide interesting perspectives on the Cultural Relations / Public Diplomacy ‘divide’ and how work in the field is to be articulated. The IRPS appears a useful tool at the national level to help mediate in interdepartmental turf wars. However, the IRPS contains national peculiarities, specifically the difficulty the British Council faces in articulating its position, making it unlikely to become transferable internationally. This is best divided into two sections, first discussing the spectrum itself and second how this reflects the difficulty of articulating the position of the British Council. 

Read more on USC PD blog

Today when funds in many countries are being restricted or greater impact demanded from the same level of funding, partnerships are seen as one way of responding to the escalating demands on Public Diplomacy. However, how far can a partnership go, and what is the ultimate demonstration of success?

The example of the British Council continuing to work in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez Crisis is often sighted in anecdote. It is used as example of the British Council continuing to work through a time of crisis. This, while a nice story, overlooks that the appointment of sequestrators, including Abdel Rehim Rashwan, who was the chief inspector of English at the Ministry of Education in Egypt. As a result of sequestration, the work was not being run under British authority but by the authority of another national government.

This reality is, however, much better than the original anecdote and demonstrates possibly the ultimate success in building relationships with a host country:

The work and relationships which the British Council had developed before the Suez crisis were considered so valuable that the sequestrators “embarked on a policy for the Council which followed to the letter its previous activities under the British“. As a result, English language classes continued and a production of Midsummer Night’s Dream drew a large crowd.

In continuing the programme in this form, the sequestrators ensured that opportunities, for example language training, were still available to the local community. As a result, the British Council continued to achieve impact despite having to withdraw national staff and hand over authority for running their programmes.

Today with increasing focus on impact and growing emphasis on partnerships, how many Public Diplomacy organisations could rely on the target audience or local community to continue their work without the PD organisation being involved?

Many current approaches are unlikely to receive this kind of support.

Some ‘pump-priming’ grants or programmes set up specifically to be sustainable will be able to continue once the original Public Diplomacy funding is removed. However, these are specific initiatives. The Egyptian example demonstrates an entire national programme continuing after national representatives were forced to withdraw; the host government took on the responsibility of running the same programme as had originally been in place.

Many current programmes are developed to be heavily centralised, focusing authority on the PD organisation, causing the programme to be reliant on it for coordination and financial support. Inevitably, when funding or official support ceases the initiatives grind to a halt. This in many instances means the impact is limited to the time frame of the funding.

Engaging with decentralised or dispersed networks would have the potential to extending the impact, by passing responsibility for the initiative on to others. This has the potential to increase longevity but reduces control, a trade off that would have to be addressed on a case by case basis.

Today, whatever the approach, sequestration resulting in another country running an organisation’s Public Diplomacy programme is unlikely at best. The example of post-Suez Egypt is an ongoing example of the potential of a relationship, well beyond the usual hopes for partnership in the 21^st century.

James Glassman has been in the UK for the last couple of days, and along with marking 9/11 he has been celebrating the 60^th Anniversary of the Fulbright Programme at Downing Street, speaking at Chatham House and appearing on the Today Programme.

Whilst his view of the rhetoric in the years immediately after 9/11 is interesting, and acknowledges the early failures in language, what is of greater concern is the approach which he has to facing violent extremism.

As in his first speech on Public Diplomacy at CFR he confuses the national interest with the Global. On the Today Programme, Glassman reiterated this position and made it clear that defeating violent extremist groups was in the national interest (and there’s no problem with a country wishing to mount an effective defence.)

The issue here is that the thrust of Glassman’s argument is;

“The standing of the United States in the world is important because it makes it easier for us to achieve our national interest which in the case of violent extremism is really a global interest. However, improving our image in the world is not an end in itself…we are working very quietly to help build networks to give young people alternatives so they do not pursue a path to violent extremism“.

By claiming a national interest as global, rather than national policy being part of a collective, this evokes the same reaction as to his speech at CFR;

While it is useful to claim that everyone works for you, there are times when “they” will only work for you if you can subsume the national into the collective, rather than branding the collective as ‘American’.

Emphasising the need for a collective narrative rather than a focus on national interest, and subsequently claiming that ‘national’ as a ‘global’ interest, Channel 4 News yesterday ran story about the UK’s domestic programme of combating violent extremism. Whilst much of the piece is about whether some of the projects were value for money, some of the interviews also highlight that being seen as working for America may actually hamper progress – a situation made worse when American Public Diplomacy claims to be a self appointed leader – or worse ‘supreme allied commander in the war of ideas‘.

The coming 60^th Anniversary of 22^nd September highlights the issue at heart of Public Diplomacy.

“The Fulbright Commission aims to bring a little more knowledge, a little more reason, and a little more compassion into world affairs and thereby increase the chance that nations will learn at last to live in peace and friendship.”

Is Fulbright, and US PD more broadly, only about bringing a little more ‘America’ into the world affairs? Or is it about exchanging knowledge and understanding?

In 1936 William Tyrrell (quoted by Philip Taylor) recognised “Modern defence consists not only in arms but in removing misunderstanding and promoting understanding”. In many instances this is still true, but is not solely a process of telling others they have misunderstood. If only they understood then they wouldn’t oppose us cannot become a common refrain for US Public Diplomacy.

Misunderstanding is also a problem for the construction of US Public Diplomacy. The failure to nuance rhetoric so that it supports and is part of a collective effort, rather than constructing a national narrative and claiming it as a global public good, demonstrates a misunderstanding what is useful to local communities that go toe to toe with groups seeking to target civilians.

Empowering dispersed networks is about taking the action most likely support the desired outcome. It is about taking a back seat when that is most helpful. It is, as Nick Cull put it, “(s)ometimes the most credible voice in public diplomacy is not one’s own“.

Empowering and engaging with dispersed networks are a powerful option worth careful consideration in Public Diplomacy practise. Indeed both in the UK and in the CFR speech Glassman has highlighted the need to work with networks. However, both times he has undermined the power of those networks by using a narrative which rhetorically claims ownership over the end goal or over the network itself for the US.

While advocating a particular national policy is a role for Public Diplomacy, James Glassman, and practitioners more broadly, should keep a keen eye on the end goal. If the end goal is communities empowered to face a common challenge, using rhetoric which damages that goal should be avoided, however tempting it is to promote the ‘national’.

Glassman is right that information operations are not enough and his emphasis on persuasion and inspiration has some merit. Yet if the US is to truly engage with the power of networks and dispersed networks specifically, he will have to add empowerment to the tools of ‘persuasion and inspiration‘ as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described them. Doing so has the power to deliver results, but only if ‘persuasion and inspiration‘ are done in a way that maintains the space (and credibility) for members of the network to act unimpeded by centralised US narratives about leadership in a war of ideas.

(Posted before the speech at Chatham House, if anything significant changes an update will follow)

John Brown’s Public Diplomacy press and blog review is back. Version 1 was a valuable resource and so far version 2 looks even better.

One of the obvious divisions within international actors (but particularly countries) conducting public diplomacy is between those that employ staff from the local community and those that ‘import’ staff from their home country. Each approach presents particular opportunities and challenges worth considering.

For those that use local staff, one advantage is the ability to communicate with the audience through members of the target community. This is an advantage, because if encourages a networked approach to communication and helps alleviate the extensive problems which can occur when projecting across cultural barriers, as discussed by RS Zaharna. Local employees present a version of your voice, but one that may be received in a different way to your own due to their peer position in the local community; particularly in situations when a national representative might be seen as an ‘outsider’. This ‘local’ advantage may be accentuated by the likely greater understanding of local cultural norms.  Those adopting a messaging approach will still need to be refined and tested for an audience but the use of staff from within that audience can provide the message with an advantage over one projected merely by outsiders.

Engagement over specific issues, similar to some NGO methodologies, requires the ability to engage a with the community rather than the presentation of a national image. As such, the national / local decision is one based as much on the best engagement with the audience rather than the best representation of home. This perspective is reinforced by Nick Cull who recently highlighted one of the lessons from past public diplomacy experience, “(s)ometimes the most credible voice in public diplomacy is not one’s own”.

Conversely, the ‘experience’ may be an important part, particularly of national public diplomacy. This is particularly the case for organisations which seek to ‘represent’ their country overseas, particularly through cultural centres, providing an image of that country similar to the original Amerika Haus offering a “window to America“. This often leads organisations to emphasise national rather than local staff, as a visitor will be meeting an inhabitant of the country being represented, rather than a member of the local community. These questions of representation, even an emphasis on soft power, rather than issue based engagement tend to influence the decision.

To be fair the above is hardly a revelation, but there are a couple of issues which tend to receive less attention. First, cost; can a local individual be paid less? If so, how much of a saving can be made in switching from national to local staff? Second, in times of crisis, ‘national’ staff tends to be withdrawn, but what happens to local staff?

1) During lean times many organisations will be tempted to make the calculation to see if they can lower staff cost by using ‘local’ staff. Interestingly the switch from national to local staff, resulting in cutting costs, will demonstrate to the local community that despite emphasis on equality or reciprocity the value of two people doing the same job is different based on nationality. Some organisations may not consider this a problem, others may find this causes difficulty when trying to engage with that same local community. This tension may come into sharp focus if there’s a mixture of local and national staff doing similar jobs. The relationship with staff may be considered largely an HR or legal issue, but it contains considerable risk for the relationship with the local community.

2) The first issue has the potential to be an ongoing tension that it can be tempting to ignore until unless it causes a serious problem within the work-place. This overlooks the wider implications of this problem. Similarly the second problem can also be easily overlooked. This is because the second consideration only exists at times of crisis; particularly when an organisation is forced to stop working, or reduce representation in a country or area. Faced with this situation many organisations withdraw their ‘national’ staff, however, the ‘local’ staff are not always given the same option.

AJS White’s personal history of the British Council highlights one of these examples. The Suez Crisis, “ended for the time being the Council’s work in Egypt and the Council’s London appointed staff had to evacuate Syria and for a brief period Jordan”. White also notes “the local staff in Jordan carried on the work”. In the case of Jordan the local staff were able to continue, and in fact in Egypt sequestrators were appointed. This happened because the tension did not extend to targeting those working for foreign organisations; when that targettting does happen local staff become trapped in an ambiguous space between their employer and the local authorities (whether that authority originates from legal position or force of arms).

This problem was perhaps best demonstrated through the situation of native translators working in Iraq. Claims were made in 2007 that Iraqi translators and been ‘Abandoned’ because, according to the Times Online, “the Government ignored personal appeals from senior army officers in Basra to relax asylum regulations and make special arrangements for Iraqis whose loyal services have put their lives at risk.”

The story highlighted the personal experience of these local staff; “One interpreter, who has worked with the Army since 2004 … was told by Downing Street that he would receive no special favours and to read a government website.”

A year later stories surfaced of the conditions in which translators who had managed to claim asylum had been housed. These stories highlighted the specific difficulties of working with translators in Iraq, but in a wider sense the local staff are often considered harder to protect than national staff.  This presents the clear pressure for public diplomacy organisations to consider what is likely to happen to the local staff should they be forced to withdraw (and many do).

However, there are some questions that are rarely discussed and experience is not often shared; If a showdown is likely, are local staff given a choice to leave or resign first? Local staff are often employed in the more junior grades, the least likely to be told in advance and even less likely to be consulted on strategy. Would those that do resign be reinstated after if the tension passes should they wish? Or is the desire to protect their family to be counted against them? Conversely, does letting large numbers of staff resign give away the plans to defy the authorities in the host country?

The answers to these questions, and the way the organisation acts toward the ‘local’ staff will be not only influence the relationship with the employees but will also demonstrate to the local community the ‘true’ opinion the PD organisation has about members of the local community.

If an organisation goes for a showdown and during the resulting fallout leaves any of the local staff to suffer the consequences (when national staff go home) the community are likely to make judgements about that decision. They may even decide that the organisation sees their community as disposable; only to be engaged with when it suits their ends. To this end, the question is both, what are the responsibilities of an organisation to local staff and what if the organisation cannot live up to the expectations of the local community?

While a national PR organisation naturally focuses on national goals, this sort of judgement is likely not only to make recruitment of staff in future difficult, but is likely to impact negatively on any attempt to re-engage with the community. With numerous areas of geopolitical tension currently create the potential for a forced withdrawal; these issues are likely to surface for a number of PD organisations around the world. Many will, very likely, cover their legal duty of care, but will they all mitigate the risks, both PD and personal, relating to their local staff?