


**Killing in the Name;  
The strategic choice - multilateral Cooperation or Competitive Identity?**

Paper for Panel

*Redefining the Diplomatic Mission: Implications for Theory and Practice*

ISA Conference NOLA



The 1992 hit *Killing in the name* by Rage Against the Machine became the 2009 Christmas number 1 in the UK music chart. In doing so it beat Joe McElderry winner of the TV show X-Factor in what many saw it as a shock result. X-Factor had been on UK TV screens for weeks, 20 million viewers had watched the final, the X-Factor website had been urging fans “let’s get Joe to Number 1!”.<sup>i</sup> A Reuters report emphasized how unlikely it seemed anyone except Joe McElderry would be Christmas number 1 given recent trends; “X Factor winners have easily secured the Christmas top spot for the last four years, and music experts have previously said there was little chance anyone could produce a serious rival.”<sup>ii</sup> However, this was not a battle between rival music labels as both acts were ultimately owned by Sony. *Killing in the Name* became Christmas number 1 as a result of a campaign started by Jon and Tracy Morter on Facebook. After the result, X Factor creator Simon Cowell acknowledged they had run “a good campaign with no dirty tricks and *without any funding*. They have been passionate and worked hard.”<sup>iii</sup>

In considering mass movements, and 21<sup>st</sup> century diplomacy, it is neither enough to identify a changing operating environment caused by the advent of new technology nor examples with large numbers of individuals participating through particular tools. Redefining the diplomatic mission will require practitioners and scholars to analyse the way individuals actually interact to understand the approaches most likely to influence behaviour. As the shift from transmitting messages to influencing behaviour is embedded in Public Diplomacy practice many will find other metaphors more useful than one based on brands, private goods and competition.

The type of success achieved by *Killing in the name* has been cited by many as evidence of the power of social media. James Glassman in describing Public Diplomacy 2.0 used at length the example of another Facebook group, One Million Voices Against the FARC started “by a young unemployed computer technician named Oscar Morales”.<sup>iv</sup> Hillary Clinton also used the example in her speech on 21<sup>st</sup> Century Statecraft alongside cases from Mexico, Iran and Moldova to illustrate the importance of coordination online.<sup>v</sup> A piece in the New York Times by Daniel Kimmage emphasized the virtue of YouTube in promoting debate and undermining Al Qaeda.<sup>vi</sup> Charles Leadbeater used the example of ‘I love Bees’, part of the advertising campaign for the computer game Halo 2 to demonstrate how networks could form around puzzles and challenges without a rigid, formal structure or in fact much idea what was going to happen next. The challenge after all was to work out what the clues left by the game developers actually meant.<sup>vii</sup> However, recognising the potential of these movements, can only take practitioners and scholars so far. Particularly when dealing with non-hierarchical approaches to Public Diplomacy, there is a danger of becoming mesmerised by the potential of large scale networks. There are two elements that need consideration before we “have that twitter-gasm”, as Nicholas Thompson wrote in urging restraint about declaring the Iranian ‘Twitter Revolution’.<sup>viii</sup>

First, the enthusiasm with which *One Million Voices Against the FARC*, *Twitter use following the Iranian election*, *I love Bees*, or *Killing in the Name* have been greeted might obscure from view the many initiatives which have been unsuccessful or gone nowhere; after all only the successful initiatives make the news. For example in 2008 Jon and Tracy Morter had run

a campaign “to usurp the X Factor Christmas top slot with a track from Rick Astley”. It was unsuccessful and that year “a similar internet campaign saw fans trying to get Jeff Buckley’s version of Hallelujah to No 1 instead of [the X Factor version]. Buckley’s version made it to No 2”, an irony lost on many in this campaign was Buckley’s was also a cover version, and “Leonard Cohen’s original, however, only made it to No 36”.<sup>ix</sup> Social media can provide the potential for large scale networks to impact on their chosen cause, equally the internet is littered with small groups achieving very little. The question is how Public Diplomacy organisations can increase the odds of initiatives being successful, rather than remaining one of the many groups that achieve little.<sup>x</sup>

Second, as much as social media is exciting and creates opportunities for Public Diplomats like never before, it equally requires serious consideration to be given to the goals toward which PD2.0 is working. Much scholarly attention has focused on the way technology is changing the environment in which Public Diplomacy is conducted. Hillary Clinton in her recent speech at the *Newseum* drew attention to this evolving context noting that “The spread of information networks is forming a new nervous system for our planet”.<sup>xi</sup> Likewise, Nick Gowing argued the “exponential technological changes are redefining, broadening and fragmenting the media landscape in dramatic ways”.<sup>xii</sup> While issues of tools, content, speed and flexibility are key elements, fundamental to PD 2.0 is “a holistic approach, an attitude” as James Glassman described it. Social media is not just about transmitting messages or justifying policy in new ways; likewise Public Diplomacy will be increasingly based on understanding and interacting with networks in a non-hierarchical manner.

The importance of the shifting mindset to a network based approach is emphasised by Kazys Varnelis who argues;

“During the space of a decade, the network has become the dominant cultural logic. Our economy, public sphere, culture, even our subjectivity are mutating rapidly and show little evidence of slowing down the pace of their evolution”.<sup>xiii</sup>


These considerations cut to the heart of redefining the diplomatic mission as it is often easier to advocate using a holistic approach than it is to deliver one. The holistic approach must be embodied in both the approaches *and* the goals defined for diplomacy. This would have to flow right through from strategy to evaluation, with appropriate processes used to analyse the impact of an initiative and the role of a diplomat within it.

### *The Full Range of Options for Influence*

In considering goals and approaches to Public Diplomacy a key decision is the aim of a particular influence initiative; the emphasis might be on the cathedral like telling others about yourself (whether by word or deed).<sup>xiv</sup> Alternatively emphasis might be placed on an approach which emphasises building cooperation within the bazaar, in the form of collective action.<sup>xv</sup>

The choice will rely on identifying the specific type of network involved;

Learning the dynamics of cooperation can help disrupt successful cooperation that we judge normatively harmful no less than allowing



us to construct successful cooperation whose outcomes and processes we normatively affirm.<sup>xvi</sup>

Context and organisational culture will influence the selection of approach. However, no matter which definition you wish to use,<sup>xvii</sup> and whether the approach falls into the cathedral or the bazaar, at the heart of Public Diplomacy is the attempt to influence others to change the odds of certain behaviours occurring.<sup>xviii</sup> This in some cases may be pursued through a focus on reputation, message, asserting identity or Soft Power, at others it can be a mutually transforming experience based on a genuine exchange.<sup>xix</sup> Ultimately, whatever the method preferred by an international actor, the most effective way of conducting Public Diplomacy is to focus on the most likely means to influence behaviour rather than focusing on what an organisation (or their constituency) wants to say about themselves.

This is not a static concern; the relationship between interlocutors shifts with every meeting, decision or action. Whether it alters the power relationship between the actors, brings them closer to identifying collective goals or shapes the structures through which they might cooperate, each event has the potential to make a specific outcome more or less likely. To quote Yochai Benkler “certain characteristics of the situation or context, of the system of interaction, will more likely lead people to cooperate stably, and others will likely lead to deterioration into behavior more consistent with the Hobbesian view of the state of nature”.<sup>xx</sup>

As such, to redefine the diplomatic mission to focus on influencing behaviour takes the ‘holistic approach’ or 21<sup>st</sup> Century Statecraft at their word and scans the entire range of options for influence and seeks to understand the position of actors within relevant networks.<sup>xxi</sup>

The holistic approach will need to be capable of looking beyond bilateral relationships, the ‘Star and Bar’ or ‘dialogues’ to consider actions with multiple actors, acting collectively. Monroe Price’s use of Derrida’s [Of Hospitality](#) provides insight, as James Glassman observed;<sup>xxii</sup>

In Price's reading, Derrida would argue that public diplomacy should move from being "primarily a means of projecting perceptions of the U.S...to one which would be a platform for cooperation, mediation, and reception - a mode of being informed as well as informing".<sup>xxiii</sup>

This re-emphasises the classic divide between two understandings of Public Diplomacy conceptualised as assertive and associative models or monologue and dialogue.<sup>xxiv</sup> However, this classical image of bilateral diplomacy has been expanded to include an increasing emphasis on cooperation between wide ranges of international actors.<sup>xxv</sup>

### *Reporting on the options*

The diplomatic mission and Statecraft in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century has been the focus of numerous reports which help frame the challenge of moving toward a ‘new’ public diplomacy.<sup>xxvi</sup> A Brookings Institution report recommended the aims of that mission would include;

“America once again will be seen as a city on a hill that stands for opportunity and freedom not just for Americans, but for the world”.

and

“Nations will cooperate willingly with the United States when they share interests and, when they disagree, will nonetheless respect the legitimacy of policies derived through democratic decision-making and based on legitimate principles”.<sup>xxvii</sup>

Hady Amr and Peter Singer further argued;

“To win the war of ideas, the United States must clearly recognize the importance of America’s voice and good standing as elements of its power and influence in the world.”<sup>xxviii</sup>

These recommendations, and many others, have sought to combine a competitive assertion of identity and leadership, as in the first and third quotes, along side rhetorical ambitions for cooperation and multilateral initiatives, as shown in the second quote from the Brookings Institution. This does not envisage a diplomacy which will “throw open the institutional windows, pull down the mind-walls and shed those feet of clay”.<sup>xxix</sup> The redefinition of the diplomatic mission must empower nimble diplomats and rest on an understanding of how interlocutors interact rather than limiting options to ponderous consideration of desired reputations, messages or attraction.

As David Steven and Alex Evans argue, “global issues are diffuse and rest on the decisions and behaviour of millions, if not billions, of people. Governments must respond by changing the way they practise diplomacy, offer development assistance and deploy force”.<sup>xxx</sup>

This paper considers: whether it is possible to aim for collaboration while also asserting a particular identity or leadership; and whether it can be possible to assert a position akin to ‘first amongst equals’ while equally asking others to collaborate in these objectives. In doing so the paper identifies areas where it is essential to make the distinction between assertive strategies and initiatives likely to promote collective action.

The way these approaches interact will impact on the options for influence. As such understanding the opportunity cost of choosing one over the other is fundamental to the redefinition of the diplomatic mission; competitive identity and soft power makes genuine cooperation difficult, where as collective action may not project an exact pre-defined message. As a result, twenty first century diplomacy will need to differentiate between those situations that call for an approach analogous to selling private goods, or brands, and those where the context has attributes closer to common pool resources.

### **Nothin' proper about ya propaganda Fools follow rules when the set commands ya**

#### *Private goods and CPR*

An attempt to influence groups to behave in the manner which provides an optimum outcome for the actors collectively requires a different mindset from that which might produce the optimum result for an actor individually. In her work on the evolution of institutions for collective action Elinor Ostrom highlights the “paradox that individually rational strategies lead to collectively irrational outcomes”.<sup>xxxi</sup> An observation as relevant to Public Diplomacy as it was to economic production and resource management.

In her work Elinor Ostrom demonstrates that analysis such as ‘the tragedy of the commons’ and *The logic of Collective Action*, have led to pessimism about the potential of cooperation and caused some to rely on external coercion or hegemonic management. However, in her words, “what makes these models so dangerous – when used metaphorically as the foundation for policy – is that the constraints that are assumed to be fixed for the purpose of analysis are taken on faith as being fixed in empirical settings, unless external authorities change them”.<sup>xxxii</sup>

Just as some approaches in economics assume the need to compete is fixed and so leads to collectively irrational outcomes, so some approaches to foreign policy and Public Diplomacy equally focus on the need to compete over security, resources, identity or power. However, in a world where many talk of common challenges, mutual understanding and trust the opportunity exists for Public Diplomacy practitioners and scholars to consider all the options when seeking to influence behaviour for collectively rational outcomes. This means looking outside models of competitive assertion and leviathan like images of government centrality; there are other ways to respond to a ‘paradox of plenty’ than focusing on competing levels of attraction and fear.<sup>xxxiii</sup>

The soft power response to a world conceptualised through the paradox of plenty, leads Nye to advocate an attempt to out compete other actors, through attraction but with the security of fear and Hard Power. However, analysis of some other ‘paradox of plenty’ have demonstrated that rather than those with the most resources winning, the resource curse lead to slower growth and even increased conflict.<sup>xxxiv</sup> Furthermore, when analysing common pool resources the focus on individual benefit has been demonstrated in numerous field studies to lead to disastrous consequences. These suggest that circumstance exists where individual advancement and having the most resources, whether natural, economic or soft power resources, does not lead to the most effective outcome.

Those maintaining a Hobbsian or Realist perspective will naturally disagree. Further analysis based on Prisoner’s Dilemma, Security Dilemma and Reassurance Games has presented different approaches to trust and mistrust.<sup>xxxv</sup> Robert Jervis used the Stag Hunt and discussed the role of mistrust in the ‘Spiral Model’. Andrew Kydd’s review of these game theory models identifies the multilateral trust model, drawing on models of public good games, to investigate factors, including relative power and geographic location, likely to influence cooperation.<sup>xxxvi</sup>

These models provide useful insight but undervalue the consideration of free riding and the finite nature of many common resources, for example the stags or rabbits being hunted. Where free riding is considered it is often concomitant with assumptions about the role of a coercive or benign hegemon. However, many issues in Public Diplomacy focus exactly on challenges needing collective action rather than bilateral security dilemmas, trust and assurance games.

In presenting the potential of collective action it may be easy to follow State calls for cooperation as based genuinely on equal power, mutually transformation and exchange. This is not the case as states often tie up that rhetoric in competitive constructions such as ‘with us or against us’, ‘winning hearts and minds’ or ‘war of ideas’ rhetoric.<sup>xxxvii</sup> In doing so

the framing confuses the rhetoric of cooperation with the assertive expression of ideas, goals and group identity.

Equally, some will continue to present Public Diplomacy as an ongoing contest for attention and power. However, the option to work toward collective goals through collaboration has great potential in influencing the behaviour of others. It requires the agency of all actors to be considered, along with their ability to free ride and the damage which can be done if individual benefit is put ahead of collective goals in a situation requiring cooperation. This is not to say that assertive models do not have a place, but a choice to be assertive will impact on the ability to engage in cooperative or collective action.

In presenting this argument, economic experiments and field research provide a useful allegory for the public diplomacy options as they provide means to understand behaviour in both collective and competitive environments. As such, recognising the difference between competitive and collaborative Public Diplomacy becomes as important as recognising the difference between private goods and common pool resources in understanding the motivation and behaviour of individuals and groups.<sup>xxxviii</sup>

“Private goods ... are characterised by the relative ease of exclusion in an economic and legal sense and by subtractability”. It is relatively easy to define a private good and decide who can access it or who cannot, where as exclusion from common pool resources (CPR) is much harder, for example water in a river or irrigation system, or fish in the sea. However, while it is hard to stop other actors using the resource, CPR share “with private goods the subtractability of resource units”.<sup>xxxix</sup> In these situations;

“the resource units are not jointly used, but the resource system is subject to joint use. Once multiple appropriators rely on a given resource system, improvements to the system are simultaneously available to all appropriators. It is costly (and in some cases infeasible) to exclude an appropriator of a resource system from improvements made to the resource system itself”.<sup>xl</sup>

The consideration of free-riders and particularly how free-riders influence the ability and willingness of groups to cooperate within a resource system are equally appropriate in Public Diplomacy. Although rarely considered, the ability to ‘free ride’ on a Public Diplomacy initiative creates a dynamic which influences the outcome of any collective action due to a refusal to incur costs when that group (or others) will benefit anyway.

Private goods like the cathedral mindset are about a predetermined product or narrative to which the producer tries to attract others.<sup>xli</sup> In contrast, successful strategies to avoid the exhaustion of common pool resources recognise the involvement of every actor, given the difficulty of exclusion, and consider non-hierarchical approaches to collaboration and collective action. In successful resolutions to CPR dilemmas the emphasis is placed on collective good rather than optimising individual return and understanding ways to account for free-riding.<sup>xlii</sup>

“To dispel misinterpretations: ‘cooperation’ does not mean ‘behaving nicely’” while a dominant actor defines the terms of an interaction from a hierarchical position.<sup>xliii</sup> Whether considering Public Diplomacy or concepts of netwar, noosphere and cyberpolitik, neither hierarchical cathedral like approaches nor the collaborative mindset are universally

appropriate. As such, it is important to clearly identify the hierarchical approaches and their limitations, to identify contexts where collaborative mindsets might have greater potential and the actions which are more likely to foster this behaviour.

**Buyin' all the products that they're sellin' ya  
They say jump and ya say how high**

*Designing the Cathedral*

The cathedral positions of soft power, competitive identities or nation brand, align closely with private goods. In considering this position, one should not forget that “comparing a nation to a brand is only a metaphor and nothing more than that”.<sup>xliv</sup> Equally, “90% of a country’s reputation is beyond the control of a country”.<sup>xlv</sup>

While saying that countries with “a positive reputation find that everything they or their citizens wish to do on the global stage is easier” seems to have a strong logic behind it, there are occasions where focusing on your own power or reputation - relying on a combination of love and fear - may not be the most appropriate approach to achieve a sustainable result.<sup>xlvi</sup>

Given that competition may not produce a sustainable result, what gain is on offer and the opportunity cost of the ongoing struggle. For most countries concerned with changing their brand, the NBI shows that despite reporting quarterly since 2005 “almost no country’s image has changed by more than 1 or 2 percentage points during this period”.<sup>xlvii</sup> Clearly headlines and coverage such as “Canadian waters stained red by baby seal cull” along with the problems the Danes had in recent years, will do reputation very little good.<sup>xlviii</sup> However, given the relative stability of most stereotypes, Simon Anholt argues for

“a plan for mobilising the strategies, activities, investments, innovations and communications of as many national sectors as possible, both public and private, in a concerted drive to prove to the world that the nation deserves a different, broader and more positive image”.<sup>xlix</sup>

This approach emphasises a coherent collective effort, but the collective is constrained to the domestic stakeholders from the place in question. This is a supply side approach even if it moves beyond nation branding as a verb to a collective effort to “form a clear, inspiring, truthful narrative”.<sup>l</sup> In doing so this process argues for closing what Daryl Copeland highlights as the “say-do gap” but remains hierarchical in its reliance on competition for individual (domestic) benefit.<sup>li</sup>

The Say-do gap expressed another way, “Socrates observed, ‘the way to achieve a better reputation is to endeavour to be what you desire to appear’.”<sup>lii</sup> If an organisation wishes to be collaborative, then it will have to adopt behaviours intended to make it more likely that groups will want to engage in collective action. To be clear; considered within the conceptualisation of competitive identity or Brand, closing the “Say-do-gap” entails encouraging all potential stakeholders from tourism, export trade, and Foreign Policy, those seeking inward investment, or recruiting experts and students in various fields, cultural exchange and the people of the country in general all to adopt the same ‘narrative’.<sup>liii</sup> This approach falls into an assertive supply side of Public Diplomacy, where all those engaging with foreign publics choose to use the same interpretation “of what the country and its

people really are, what they stand for, where they are going and how they are going to get there”.<sup>liv</sup>

While firms may think of their brand as their relationship with their market or stakeholders, and without doubt reputation is formed through the interpretation of your actions by others, the development of the collective vision or ‘truthful’ narrative within the theory of competitive identity takes place on the side of the producer. This is because it is the coalition of national stakeholders that forms the narrative, which they hope through their actions and words will prove they deserve a particular reputation. Acknowledging that deeds will influence reputation is important, however, forming a coalition around a single clear national narrative in countries that value diversity and the contribution of migrant populations or Diaspora communities may be overly optimistic or at least have fairly limited applicability.

It has been argued that dissent might be limited and that a country’s narrative can be reinforced within the population “through a ‘soft power’ approach, where the fundamental attraction – and ultimate benefits – of a shared national strategy are communicated well enough to stir a genuine motivation on the part of the various stakeholders, both public and private, to join forces”.<sup>lv</sup> The language here reinforces the private good style of the cathedral building approach in competitive identity; others within the country are ushered into a pre-existing narrative structure. Stirring others to ‘join forces’ emphasises the narrative pre-dates some members joining the coalition. If not, what is the soft power for and how is the attraction to ideas exercised if the coalition does not form the narrative until all have joined the coalition? If others are not ushered into the pre-existing narrative how does the coalition maintain a clear coherent narrative when a new member or stakeholder joins?

**What? The land of the free?  
Whoever told you that is your enemy?**

*Limitations of a Cathedral*

The limitation of this form of the hierarchical approach stems from the need for at least some stakeholders to buy into a pre-existing collective narrative. In a pluralistic society, potentially one which values diversity, multiple migrant communities and freedom of speech, there will be those who dissent or follow an alternative ‘defect strategy’ preferring to choose the optimum individual benefit over the best option for the collective, particularly when this collective option may see lower return for the individual. For example, Rage Against the Machine, Green Day, and Anti Flag have all made a reputation around the world for the defiance of and challenging American authorities. This can be thought of as the Green Day problem –as the band toured the world pronouncing their anti-Bush administration message, including to 130,000 people in the UK.<sup>lvi</sup> The million selling albums of Green Day and their counterparts owe their success in part to the position they took *against* the foreign policy of the country from which they originate.<sup>lvii</sup> In many instances the attraction to individual success will out way that of the pre-existing shared narrative when constructed within a paradigm of competitive national identities.

Drawing on soft power to attract other stakeholders links competitive identity to another hierarchical concept; Smart Power. In presenting the argument for smart power Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye argue “by complementing U.S. military and economic might with greater investments in its soft power, America can build the framework it needs to tackle tough global challenges”.<sup>lviii</sup> The Smart Power approach acknowledges that different elements of the national attempt at influence can impact on each other, but this is still a hierarchical conception on the national level as “Soft power is the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others *to adopt your goals*”.<sup>lix</sup>

Much has been written about soft power, but neither advocates nor critics can get away from the reality that in soft power “the goals are created and then means are used to persuade others to enter into action in support of those goals”.<sup>lx</sup> One critique of this approach by Anne Allison argues that “in this age when global soft power is becoming increasingly decentered, the place assumed in geographies of power – both real and imaginary – becomes correspondingly deterritorialized – delinked from a firmly bounded territory”.<sup>lxi</sup> Linked with this observation, is the increasing emphasis on Public Diplomacy involving non-State actors. Both Soft Power and Competitive Identity have their role but have particular limitations when applied to cooperative approaches and international collaboration involving non-state or non-geographically located actors. Primarily, the emphasis on attracting others to certain values or goals creates a scenario where the newcomer has to align with the existing identity, values or coalition narrative rather than it being mutually transformational.

Smart Power, by incorporating Soft Power absorbs these inherent assumptions and limitations. Using Smart Power narrows the potential to assess all the options for influence; given that soft power is about getting others to adopt your goals, it cannot be used in genuine exchange, which presents the possibility of both sides moving position. Furthermore, as Daryl Copeland observed, it risks trying to turn diplomats into soldiers.<sup>lxii</sup> Few would disagree that American use of Hard Power during the Bush administration has reduced its reputation and attractiveness. However, the unity of Soft and Hard Power is not the only conclusion which can be drawn from this situation. In the face of current and likely future global challenges, the smart approach is to consider all options not just those which fall into a limited Soft + Hard Power equation; genuine collaboration and cooperation may not be possible purely through attracting others to your position or values.<sup>lxiii</sup>

Equally, during the Bush administration, James Glassman’s repeated use of joke made by Joseph Lieberman that Glassman was the “[supreme allied commander in the war of ideas](#)”, limited the ability of others to join in cooperative action. This was because he adopted a hierarchical conception of America’s role within collaborative action. It is very difficult for groups opposed to violent extremism to take action if within their community being publicly aligned with US policy would undermine their credibility at home. If others have more credible voices, it makes little sense to undermine their position if the focus in 21<sup>st</sup> century diplomacy is influencing behaviour.<sup>lxiv</sup>


These approaches and other advocacy based methods of Public Diplomacy are limited in the way they can engage with cooperative and collective action. Specifically, they offer few opportunities through which each actor can engage on their terms, with their identity,

rather than being subsumed into a dominant identity or value set. Challenges which span the globe and cross national boundaries may not be best faced through the unwavering assertions of identity even if backed by aligned action; instead the agency of each actor must be recognised.

As Public Diplomacy is an attempt to change the odds of certain outcomes occurring, a strategy which deploys actions likely to facilitate collaboration has the potential to achieve desired results in situations where advocacy and competitive identity would be inappropriate. The collaborative approach is likely to require moving away from place or competitive demonstration of identity as the defining aspect of a group, whether nation, region, or city. Shifting the focus to cooperative behaviours creates the ability to engage in collective action with dispersed groups of activists, communities of migrants and diaspora, or people linked by desire for particular actions. The focus of much recent commentary on large scale engagement has been on the use of social media. While the understanding of cooperation must engage with factors influencing collaborative behaviours and networks in all areas of Public Diplomacy, digital diplomacy provides a logical start point as social media and ‘many to many’ have been receiving significant attention recently.

Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, and social networks within Public Diplomacy 2.0 have been regularly referenced as providing great potential. However, very few practitioners or analysts have ventured any comment on the form these networks take and the way individuals actually behave within them.<sup>lxv</sup> More specifically what factors make cooperation within particular networks more likely than others? [Brian Hocking](#) and R.S. Zaharna provide notable exceptions examining [networked approaches](#) to communication and highlighting, the importance of shifting mindset from providing information to developing [relationships](#).<sup>lxvi</sup> One form of this networked mentality is multilateral diplomacy, for example the EU or NATO along with concepts such as Infopolitik.<sup>lxvii</sup>


Daryl Copeland recently highlighted the different mindsets practitioners would need to adopt and the importance of engaging as a peer when in a peer to peer environment. He described the [guerrilla diplomat](#) as someone who “will know how to swim with comfort and ease in the sea of the people rather than flop around like a fish out of water, and prefer to mix with the population rather than mingle with colleagues inside the embassy walls”.<sup>lxviii</sup> This effectively means engaging with people in their terms rather than engaging in broadcast through for example new media.






question of high numbers, ignoring the underlying pockets of interaction and coordination.<sup>lxx</sup>

Recognising the role of coordination can be demonstrated through the example of Twitter use following the Iranian election; users were forced to identify more specific #tags which resonated with their particular community following the surge in tweets about Iran and the tag #IranElection. The numbers were eye-catching, but at a peak of over [22,500 tweets per hour](#) for one #tag alone it is clear that nobody could be reading them all. The relevance to PD 2.0 and ideas about 'many to many' is looking beyond the surge of interest to understand how communities are interacting within a network. This behaviour can be identified by mapping the way individuals choose to behave, in this sense identifying their tweets with particular #tags.<sup>lxxi</sup>



The image above demonstrates that users were involved in two virtually separate conversations in the days following the election.<sup>lxxii</sup> Individuals interacting through the four spheres on the left and the individuals centralised around one #tag on the right. This shows that while all these individuals are tweeting about Iran they are not been accessing the same conversation.<sup>lxxiii</sup> As a result, the degree of meaningful 'many to many' contact is lower than it might initially appear. Equally to engage effectively it is important to understand which conversation you are joining. To further emphasise this position, the pattern continued until November where the map shows only limited growth in users shifting from one side to the other.



Depending on the individuals with which PD2.0 wanted to engage or collaborate, different hub points, in this case #tags would be more important than others. The same would be true of users with large numbers of followers, if those followers were important to the Public Diplomacy organisation. Deeper understanding of networks would allow for effective interaction with groups, for example, [swarms](#) and flash mops.<sup>lxxiv</sup> Equally in the lead up to the withdrawal of financial support, it could be possible to plan a transition from centralised to decentralised network which would give projects a greater chance of sustainability. In engaging with large scale networks, it is important to analyse those networks and visualise the resulting data, as 'many to many' can take many different forms.<sup>lxxv</sup>

To successfully combine network mapping with engaging in a peer environment, whether thought of as Public Diplomacy 2.0 or [Open Source Public Diplomacy](#), diplomats will have to collaborate or cooperate with communities based on the interests of those communities. This will mean rethinking the available options from both hierarchical and non-hierarchical perspectives and fully accepting Nick Cull's observation, "(s)ometimes the most credible voice in public diplomacy is not one's own".<sup>lxxvi</sup> Wanting others to speak out may lead a journalist or public diplomat to consider message orientated hierarchical approaches. However, in doing so they might limit the ability or willingness of individuals to cooperate. As a result, the behaviour the organisation is trying to promote becomes less likely.

**But I learned to burn that bridge and delete  
Those who compete...at a level that's obsolete**

#### *Evidence of cooperation*

As very few experiments have been conducted directly relating to Public Diplomacy, experimental research from other fields including economics, can provide insights on which approaches and further specific experiments could be designed. For example, experiments have demonstrated that creating a group identity can increase the generosity shown to

others that participants recognise as part of the same group.<sup>lxxvii</sup> This suggests Public Diplomacy could benefit from creating opportunity for groups or networks to form. While one might approach this from a hierarchical 'join us' approach, collective action through a peer to peer based relationship might be better suited to many contexts. Furthermore, Elinor Ostrom's work on Common Pool Resources (CPR) provides insight into situations where optimal is contested between individual and collective interests, and aligns with further experimental work on the cultural influence on the concept of fairness. This insight is useful to Public Diplomacy as 'trust', 'fairness' or 'legitimacy' along with competing individual and collective interests are common considerations in influencing behavior as it relates to foreign policy.

For example, some countries allocated large resources to Public Diplomacy initiatives in advance of the COP-15 negotiations in Copenhagen. CPR thinking provides a useful means to consider the challenge facing Public Diplomats; if CO2 production is sufficiently reduced by some countries all will benefit. Equally, if some countries continue to increase CO2 production all will suffer the consequences. Should action be successful, free-riders will benefit from the success without incurring costs of action. Should action fail to avert large scale climate change, those that bore the cost of the failed attempt can have no expectation of lessened local impact due to their efforts.<sup>lxxviii</sup>

Involvement is important as processes adopted following collective deliberation tend to elicit greater cooperative rather than defect behaviours. Involvement in the process can lead to adherence to the result. A review by Yochai Benkler highlighted that; "norms chosen through a process of self-governance can be internalized as "belonging" to the agent who lives by them".<sup>lxxix</sup> To be successful there need to be "more-or-less clearly understood behavioral expectations about what counts as "cooperative" in a given system" and "an actual, psychologically-felt consent of the governed, rather than the notional one of social contract".<sup>lxxx</sup>

In Public Diplomacy terms, the felt consent relates directly to the ability to input into the collective process rather than having a pre-defined role toward a pre-existing goal foisted upon an actor in the name of cooperation. A show of listening is not enough, the communities you want to engage, must feel they have been genuinely heard.<sup>lxxxii</sup> Furthermore, collective action relies on shared understandings of the 'rules' under which cooperation is undertaken.

### **Fairness**

An idea of fairness is important to the development of collective action, a competitive winner takes all attitude is likely to undermine the stability of a cooperative system. As Elinor Ostrom found in studying collective management of resource systems;

Without a fair, orderly, and efficient method of allocating resources units, local appropriators have little motivation to contribute to the continued provision of the resource system.<sup>lxxxii</sup>

In this analysis the accepted fairness of the process or situation is important, otherwise individuals will either free-ride, enjoy benefits without costs, act in a manner which is counter to the optimal outcome of the collective. Equally experiments have shown, "people who dislike inequality are willing to take costly actions to reduce inequality although this may result in a net reduction of their material payoff".<sup>lxxxiii</sup> This places the emphasis on two further factors, the involvement in defining the system and variance in the interpretation of fairness within the system.

This relies on understanding of what is considered fair. “What is socially and psychologically experienced as fair is ...cross-culturally contingent and diverse, subject to framing, ideology, and manipulation”.<sup>lxxxiv</sup> Alongside experiments showing that the perceived worth of an item (though with same actual value) can influence strategy in the same scenario, investigations of trust games have shown that different strategies were more likely in different cultures.<sup>lxxxv</sup>

Literally hundreds of experiments in dozens of countries using a variety of game structures and experimental protocols suggest that in addition to their own material payoffs, subjects care about fairness and reciprocity, are willing to change the distribution of material outcomes among others at a personal cost to themselves.<sup>lxxxvi</sup>

This created an empirical challenge to the assumption of the selfish rational actor, *Homo economicus*. It is further supported by recent “transcultural neuroimaging studies which have demonstrated that one's cultural background can influence the neural activity that underlies both high- and low-level cognitive functions”.<sup>lxxxvii</sup> Furthermore, the interpretation of fairness and even good or bad can influence degrees of cooperation and trust. This has been investigated through experiments on whether the perceptions of moral character would modulate the neural systems in trust games. During the experiment, participants were given information about a number of hypothetical trading partners and “despite equivalent reinforcement rates for all partners, participants were persistently more likely to make risky choices with the 'good' partner”.<sup>lxxxviii</sup> In addition, molecular genetic studies have “begun to identify genetic mechanisms for personal traits related to reinforcement learning and complex social decision making, further illuminating the biological basis of social behavior”.<sup>lxxxix</sup>

In Public Diplomacy terms, taking an advocacy based approach to justifying the fairness of a policy position may have little traction in communities who have a different understanding of fairness from the actor, if the justification is based on the policymaker's interpretation of fairness. Only through genuine engagement and collaborative working can disparate groups develop a shared view of what is fair and cooperative. Equally the system of benefit must also be perceived to be fair to those involved, whether that benefit is monetary, in kind or virtual.<sup>xc</sup>

The degree of empathy can also be modulated by the understanding of fairness. In one experiment during which participants were shown ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ individuals receiving pain, demonstrated the degree of empathy was influenced by the moral judgment of the participant. While empathy was evident in some situations it was “significantly reduced in males when observing an unfair person receiving pain”.<sup>xc1</sup> As such if there are different understandings of fairness, there can also be different levels of empathy in response to particular events. This can impact on public diplomacy activities as however justified an action appears to the public diplomat, if the organization they represent is viewed as unfair within the community then appealing to the empathy of the community may not be a successful strategy. Equally, if working in a cooperative initiative, fairness becomes an important part of gaining greater engagement, alongside a useful moral principal.

Considering other understandings of fairness aids the development of cooperation, but genuine exchange and cooperation also provides access to detailed local knowledge. Field study of cooperative systems to deal with CPR dilemmas has demonstrated the efficacy of internally developed rules when compared to those that were imposed by an external authority.

While legitimate and effective rules can come from external sources, our studies suggest that a more effective source is the appropriators themselves. The rules used in a self-organized CPR are often tailored to the specific characteristics of the CPR.


Rules imposed by external authorities may fail to draw on knowledge of the time and place characteristics of a specific CPR. In fact, such rules may be less effective, or even counterproductive, compared to those designed locally.<sup>xcii</sup>

This challenges the focus on benign or coercive hegemon. Furthermore, in a study of water rights it was concluded that shared ownership can be more efficient than land ownership and “farmer owned systems that devise boundary and allocation rules to fit their local circumstances are more likely to perform better than government-owned systems relying on a limited set of rules”.<sup>xciii</sup> In cases like these, involvement of local communities pays greater dividend than attempting to usher the community into a predetermined cathedral like programme. This provides not only the potential for a sense of inclusion within the process but the ability to draw on local knowledge and understanding in developing a Public Diplomacy initiative.

The damage which even a benign external influence can cause in a community has been well documented. In Taiwan, government attempts to gain support from framers by providing grants change the farming associations “from highly participatory associations of farmers who knew their system well and volunteered to run the association and to manage it, to a system that ‘one gets from the government’.” The attempt to create a beneficial system for the farmers, fundamentally changed the nature of the system, resulting in the State as a system of organization undermining, or ‘crowding out’, the community based system of collective action.<sup>xciv</sup> This is not an isolated case; “The disastrous effects of nationalizing formerly communal forests have been well documented” was well as similar case studies of the impact of State intervention on inshore fisheries.<sup>xcv</sup>

### Bullet in the head

It has been shown in both experimental work and field study that individuals engaged in cooperative action are in certain cases willing to punish a transgressor even though this is also costly to a transgressed individual. In other words, “punishment almost invariably is costly to the punisher, while the benefits from punishment are diffusely distributed over the members”.<sup>xcvi</sup> This is also the case with monitoring of agreements as individuals must incur the cost of their monitoring activity but the benefit is collective. In these instances, rational egoists driven by consideration of economic efficiency, the costs are assumed to outweigh the benefits, but as Elinor Ostrom has demonstrated, in her work on CPR and graduated sanctions, this is not necessarily the case when taking a holistic approach to cost / benefit which considers the value of prestige and information alongside the rational benefit of economic efficiency.<sup>xcvii</sup>



Mancur Olson has argued that “unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, *rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests*”. However, as Elinor Ostrom commented, this “argument rests largely on the premise that one who cannot be excluded from obtaining the benefits of a collective good once the good is produced has little incentive to contribute voluntarily to the provision of that good”.<sup>xcviii</sup> The massive growth of open source software, creative commons and other analogous initiatives along with field research around the world has demonstrated that individuals are willing to voluntarily contribute to collective goods which they could just wait to receive anyway. This means while

free riders need to be considered, Public Diplomats can also consider the contribution some will make at their own cost – and it might be the Public Diplomat which they choose to punish either directly or by undermining the project. This is key as relying on the belief it would be good for someone may not be enough; if a community feel a transgression has taken place they may disadvantage themselves to administer punishment.

### **How long? Not long, cause what you reap is what you sow**

The difference between a message orientated strategy and one which genuinely engages with a group sharing involvement, resources and collective goals can be shown through recent strategy documents and reports from the UK and Australia.

The [Template Twitter strategy for Government Departments](#) appeared on the Cabinet Office [Digital Engagement Blog](#). Originally written by Neil Williams, head of corporate digital channels at the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), it is intended to be re-used “however you like, be that to adopt it wholesale or remix it to suit the needs of your organisation”.

The second document, [Bringing Cultural Relations Online; 20 Key recommendations](#) appeared via to [Yoosk](#). Written for the British Council, “It focuses on the practical challenges of building an online presence that will lead to closer relations between the organisation and its target audience.”

Both documents fail to attend to the need for information through understanding or mapping the network with which the projects interact. However, despite their similar network related lacuna, the contrast between them is stark, the [template twitter strategy](#) emphasises<sup>xcix</sup>;

- Extend reach of existing corporate messages online
- Provide an informal, ‘human’ voice of the organisation to promote comprehension of and engagement with our corporate messages
- Provide thought leadership and credibility, increasing our visibility as the experts in our remit within the online space
- The evaluation methods focusing on followers and traffic

In contrast, [Bringing Cultural Relations online; 20 key recommendations](#) emphasises;

- Content doesn’t only come from the organisation’s staff, but also the extended networks of users built around its activities.
- Partnerships are the norm: do it alone and it will not succeed.
- Don’t invite collaboration unless you are genuinely open to ideas and prepared to invest in them.

The obvious difference in emphasis is that of collective action rather than corporate micro-broadcast. However, while Bringing Cultural Relations Online, is a step away from the heavily centralised approach of the template Twitter strategy, there is still a tendency in the recommendations to focus on the organisation’s brand, reputational risk and resource savings. For example;

“Hosting interaction on a partner’s site can offset reputational risks while at the same time offering savings on staff resources needed if you were to host it on your own”.

Such an observation is no doubt accurate and resource savings useful in the current financial context. However, beyond the cost saving an organisation should consider engaging people in their own spaces rather than insisting they come to your own (or that of your cost saving partner) due to the positive impact this can have on the interaction. This is the essence of a dispersed engagement strategy.

Interestingly, the document also notes;

- The key to success lies outside the organisation

A salient observation, but to be effective, a Public Diplomacy organisation must consider the relationship between power and position within a network along with the factors which will change the odds of others wanting to engage in collective action.<sup>c</sup>

### **Take the power back**

*At work in the bazaar*

The report [Engage](#) produced by The Australian Government 2.0 taskforce demonstrates the potential of genuine cooperation. The commitment to collective action is emphasised by the use of creative commons, openness and [govhack](#); a day sponsored by the taskforce for programmers to develop 2.0 tools for governmental use. This day long programming effort created a genuine sense of involvement by interested communities. The result was [It's Bugged, Mate](#) a tool to enable visitors to sketch out a local maintenance problem with public infrastructure on Google Maps complete with diagrams and comments.

However, the report is less successful in considering the relationship between bureaucracy and collective engagement. Recommendations on ‘Accessibility’ struggle to align bureaucratic need for information control and operating in the spaces their constituents inhabit.

*“It is recommended that agencies prevent personnel from accessing social networking websites that pose a higher than normal security risk relating to the unauthorised release of government information or disclosure of personal information”.*<sup>ci</sup>

These sites include Twitter, Facebook, and Myspace, despite the taskforce using both Twitter and Facebook, along with [Ideascale](#) while working on the report. How government 2.0 is intended to [Engage](#) while banning use of popular social media tools is not fully addressed in the report. The importance as discussed through CPR dilemmas is to facilitate discussion amongst all those involved, rather than adopting a hierarchical approach which emphasizes the position of the external actor and may undermine community action. For Public Diplomacy to increase impact through collaborative approaches, strategy must be built on an understanding of the networks within which they operate. Collaborative approaches or partnerships will need to be approached in a way appropriate to the context, respecting local knowledge rather than imposing external rules.

**Now freedom must be fundamental  
From Johannesburg to South Central**

To realise the greatest potential of collaborative behaviours will require clarity about the types of networks in which Public Diplomacy and PD 2.0 operate. Equally, at times Public diplomats will need to consider how they can be part of a conversation, rather than finding new means to project hierarchical messages. This is not a question of either messaging or conversation but using the right tone or approach for the situation; without this understanding, a Public Diplomat risks reducing the chances of extending influence.

Many speak of two way – but this has to be thought of in clear terms within strategy and bureaucracy as an individual diplomat may come up against a dichotomy between priorities identified through cooperative activity and those on which line management insists. This means a strategy which is genuinely about cooperation, or an expansion of the two way street, will have to provide practitioners with the latitude needed to influence behaviour rather than a strict predetermination of message.

Yochai Benkler provides a series of categories which he argues are likely to improve the likelihood of cooperation within policy interventions.<sup>cii</sup> To face the specific challenge of public diplomacy initiatives, practitioners and scholars can draw on experiments, insight and analysis from Economics, Game Theory, Open Source Public Diplomacy, Network Analysis, Psychology and Social Sciences. This combination suggests a range of areas which could be considered during the development of an initiative to ensure there is clarity about whether the approach is competitive or cooperative and that the right tone is used;

#### *Inclusion*

- Choice, recognise and actor's agency
- Free-riders, some will benefit without incurring cost.
- Generosity toward 'in group' or people with which an actor identifies homophily.
- Is a Snowdrift dilemma more appropriate than imagining the interaction in Security, Prisoner's, or stag-hunt dilemmas in considering relative individual and collective benefit.
- Nash Equilibrium - Is the position one in which both will have to move position for either to receive an improved outcome.

#### *Involvement*

- Deliberative collective planning when seeking cooperation – this draws from inclusion.
- Interact with a community on their terms; 'the wisdom of the maxim that each party should give the other what the other wants, rather than what the giver thinks is good for him'.<sup>ciii</sup>
- For this to work there needs to be consideration of power and position in the network.
- If people feel involved / ownership they will contribute for free.

#### *Information*

- Understanding networks in strategy and visualise important connections and nodes.
- Consider local knowledge and locally developed strategies.
- Monitoring adherence; Are others sticking to what is being said - the 'say-do-gap'.

### *Fairness*

- Recognize agency – are other groups genuinely included and involved.
- There may be different interpretations of fairness within the group, it may not be enough to say something is 'fair'.
- Gendered & local understanding of success.
- How is the result to be distributed - who decides and how is this decided to be a 'fair' distribution.

### *Punishment*

- People will punish others at cost to themselves - even if cost is to an individual and benefit is for the entire group.
- If a community feels injustice, they will undermine a project even at cost to themselves and even if the project is intended to be of benefit to that community.

### *Positive and Negative Impact on behaviour*

- Even well intentioned actions can have a negative impact.
- Risk is a precondition of trust – you have to value what you trust someone with and if that relationship is based on trust there is a chance you will lose something you value.

Through these areas Public Diplomacy can move toward effective collective action. The defining element of 21<sup>st</sup> Century Diplomacy that which set it apart from models of previous centuries will be the move away from States following an instinct to compete towards engaging and cooperating as part of a dispersed group of communities identifying groups with which an actor can work to change the odds of certain outcomes occurring.

As Sergei Lavrov, Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, argued

“Today, we should practice multi-vector network diplomacy conducive to flexible cooperation among groups of states for the sake of harmonizing identical interests. Today, we are not engaged — or, at least, should not be engaged — in the struggle against any state or in the containment policy. Time has come to apply collective efforts to promote concrete interests of the international community as a whole or of groups of states.”<sup>civ</sup>

However, 21<sup>st</sup> Century Diplomacy takes one step beyond multi-vectored interactions between states, it will take the open source ethic of working within groups made up of actors from numerous.

Considering factors that influence the success of policy interventions intended to promote citizenship Elinor Ostrom wrote, it can be a

“delicate problem of designing institutions that enhance citizenship rather than crowding it out. Instead of relying on the state as the central, top-down substitute for all public problem solving, it is necessary to design complex, polycentric orders that involve both public governance mechanisms and private market and community institutions that complement each other”<sup>CV</sup>

Equally research into cooperation and social capital has shown;

The likelihood of crafting and sustaining rules in situations involving many exogenous changes is dramatically reduced. The capacity to design their own rules will not enhance the outcomes achieved by the nontrusting and narrowly selfish individuals of the world, but will enhance the outcomes of those who are prepared to extend reciprocity to others and interact with others with similar inclinations. Those who have developed forms of mutual trust and social capital can utilize these assets to craft institutions that avert the CRP dilemmas and arrive at reasonable outcomes.<sup>cvi</sup>

In contrast, in 2001 Jamie Metzl wrote “As the forces of globalization and the information revolution transform international relations, U.S. foreign policy institutions remain hunkered down in outmoded approaches and insular institutional cultures”.<sup>cvi</sup> Nearly 10 years on, the transition from 20<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> century diplomacy is still in the future.

## Appendix 2.0

The argument presented in this paper argues for the use of a metaphor which more closely adheres to the context in which many Public Diplomacy initiatives are conducted. The use of a brand based metaphor emphasising scarcity of attention and competition for that scarce resource is contrasted with that of Common Pool Resources. The importance of differentiating between engaging in a competitive approach and using social media for a genuinely cooperative activity is emphasised by [Evgeny Morozov](#) who wrote;

“So far, new media has been deployed to help *create supply* of American ideas on the Internet, on the assumption that improving global access to unfiltered and carefully crafted American positions would help dispel some of the myths about the country and its policies (i.e. the real assumption is: if only they had the means to learn more about us, they would be on our side)”

This is despite the emphasis on engagement and collective action through new and social media. Morozov contrasts rhetoric of cooperation with American ‘supply’ of ideas through these tools. This is despite the emphasis on discussion within ‘the war of ideas’, as Senator Richard Lugar argued “technology offers new ways to perform the traditional task of spreading the American message”.<sup>cvi</sup> This argument can be elaborated, through a more detailed discussion of social media.

The failure to embrace the distinction between using new media tools and adopting genuinely collaborative mindsets can be seen in this longer quote;

... social networking technologies are more often used to enable individuals across a country, or across the globe, to interact, engage, and become empowered. Although this means that *our government will not be able to control the message as well as it might with conventional public diplomacy tools*, I believe it is a risk worth taking. Terrorists and other anti-American *propagandists* have for some time been using the Internet and other techniques

to communicate and recruit. America needs to beat them at their own game, especially since we invented most of the technology.<sup>cix</sup>

Considering message and message control are not the only options within Public Diplomacy, Equally beating propagandists at their own game is not collaborative. If collaboration is valued then an organisation must adopt behaviours more likely to encourage collaboration and collective benefit; the rules are not fixed – it is not compulsory to play within the terms of the propagandists’ game to defeat terrorists. To take an example from another field, “the creators of social software design platforms with the group in mind – they seek to structure opportunities and constraints that make the group work better, rather than ease the lot of any given individual”.<sup>cx</sup> Senator Lugar fails to make the distinction between these positions.

Despite the recent work on networks and the importance of concepts such as boundary spanners, The Congressional Research Service’s [U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and Current Issues](#) and Colleen Graffy’s recent article about [The Rise of Public Diplomacy 2.0](#) left further questions unanswered about the extent to which adding ‘2.0’ to the name had changed the strategy and particularly mindset of those tasked with enacting it. Specifically, have public diplomats accepted they are interacting in an environment that emphasises peer to peer engagement, or do they still cling to ideas of hierarchy and privilege?

Effective Public Diplomacy 2.0 is a combination of tools and mindset based on an understanding of the particular network with which the organisation is interacting. While at times material will need to be pushed, this should not obscure an approach which focuses on engaging with people as peers in a genuinely symmetrical interaction. "It doesn't make sense to be using Web 2.0 tools for the sake of using Web 2.0 tools," as Sheila Campbell put it, nor does just using the tools realise the full potential of 2.0.

Graffy’s argument highlights the dichotomy; “Social networking tools ... resolve a lot of public diplomacy challenges in the field. They allow public affairs staff to engage with masses of individuals without the need for members of the public to travel to our now often isolated and distant embassies and go through off-putting security controls”. However, some diplomats, according to Graffy, haven’t even begun to engage with new tools and approaches; “Identifying ways to ‘push out’ material onto the Internet is still absent in many overseas posts. This is a critical deficiency; we simply cannot assume, in this open, competitive system, that consumers are regularly checking a U.S. embassy website”. While wisely advocating the use of new tools and recognising that people have other things to do than read the embassy website, looking for new ways to ‘push out’ material from inside the embassy walls is telling both in mindset and metaphor.

The use of language such as ‘consumer’ or audience and the focus on methods to ‘push out’ material highlights the traditional hierarchical mindset. This mindset has lead some diplomats to build virtual walled gardens where they feel safe interacting, while other colleagues use Twitter as little more than a micro-broadcast system. At times these may be the right approaches, while at others Public Diplomacy 2.0 is about using new tools on the terms the public want to use them not as defined by the State’s desire to project messages. There is a reason they are known as ‘social media’ not ‘push media’.

In contrast, adopting a network based approach can provide clarity about what behaviour an initiative is intended to achieve. For example, The *New Technologies in Emergencies and Conflicts* report, similar to many discussions of Public Diplomacy 2.0, emphasises the potential of connecting ‘many to many’. For example Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Judith A. McHale;

Advances in technology are providing new tools to do just that. They are enhancing our communications and our engagement, and providing unprecedented opportunities to develop new relationships. They allow us to move from an old model in which our government speaks as one-to-many, to a powerful new model of engaging interactively and collaboratively as many-to-many.<sup>cxix</sup>

Also Evan Potter in collection of essays produced by the Foreign Office in 2008 International communication, which since the dawn of the motion picture has been premised on a one-to-many broadcasting model, is now moving ineluctably towards a web-enabled many-to-many format.<sup>cxix</sup>


In light of the obvious potential of online communication, as John Brown noted, the question has been posed how;

the many-to-many "connections" made possible by the internet can, in fact, act as a last-three-feet, truly personal, one-on-one "human presence".<sup>cxix</sup>

So, in thinking about the potential it is first important to consider what ‘many to many’ means when used in relation to Public Diplomacy?

Networks of size, implied by ‘many’ rapidly become too large to be meaningful all channel networks, due to the constraints of time. For example, even if ‘many to many’ was just a group of 30, it would require 870 messages for everyone to send every other member of the group a message. If it were 300 members it would require 89,700 messages and 1000 members 999,000 messages.

A relatively modest all channel network of 30,000 participants would require 899,970,000 messages. Planning therefore needs to consider whether it really is ‘many to many’ or many ‘few to few’ contacts. Swamping inboxes and social network sites with messages between participants means participants will not have the time to read all the messages. Alternatively, any engagement will be fleeting at best. The other likely alternative is that participants will opt out of a ‘many to many’ all channel network and engage instead in one of the many ‘few to few’ groups instead. Identifying the key hub points or ultra-peers will be fundamental to nurturing and analysing networks in Public Diplomacy. This will impact on the development of strategy, as targeted ‘few to few’ would require knowledge of the network, if not perfect knowledge. In addition, if attempting to develop and nurture a



network then consideration has to be given to how participants will recognise other members and the points they are most likely to coordinate around.<sup>cxiv</sup>

The discussion in this appendix has sought to demonstrate some of the considerations through which an engagement with networks in a society. Many of these examples fit more closely with a metaphor based on CPR than one based on selling private goods. Redefining the diplomatic mission will need to take account of both free-riders and the full range of influences on behaviour.

## End Notes

- 
- i (Let's get Joe to Number 1, 2009)
- ii ("X Factor" winner faces Xmas No.1 battle, 2009)
- iii Simon Cowell, quoted in (Rage beats Joe McElderry to Christmas No 1, 2009) emphasis added
- iv (Glassman, 2008)
- v (Clinton, 2010)
- vi (Kimmage, 2008)
- vii (Leadbeater)
- viii (Thompson, 2009)
- ix (Simon Cowell: Rage Against the Machine campaign is 'stupid', 2009)
- x (Fisher, Public Diplomacy is Changing the Odds, 2008)
- (Fisher, Changing the Odds; The State-Private network and the development of American Studies in Europe, 2005)
- xi (Clinton, 2010)
- xii (Gowing, 2009) p. 1
- xiii (Varnelis, 2010) p. 1
- xiv (Bröckerhoff, 2008)
- xv The Cathedral and Bazaar concepts are drawn from:  
(Raymond, 1999)  
For a longer discussion of these concepts in relation to Public Diplomacy see:  
(Fisher, Music for the Jilted Generation; Open Source Public Diplomacy, 2008)
- xvi (Benkler, 2008) p. 11
- xvii (Gilboa, Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy, 2008)
- xviii This is similar to some concepts within the Military communications. As Andrew MacKay and Steve Tatham argue; "Central to our thesis is the need to move influence from the periphery of the command's thinking to its very epicentre." See;  
(MacKay & Tatham, 2009) p. 8
- xix Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault, 'Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy', *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616 (March 2008) pp. 10-30  
RS Zaharna, 'Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives: Information and Relational Frameworks', in Nancy Snow and Philip Taylor (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, (Routledge, London) 2008 pp. 86 – 100  
Ali Fisher, "Music for the Jilted Generation; Open Source Public Diplomacy", *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, vol. 3, no. 2, 2008  
Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The means to Success in World Politics*, (Public Affairs: New York) 2004
- xx (Benkler, 2008) p. 10
- xxi For analysis of the impact position in networks has on Public Diplomacy:  
(Fisher, Looking at the Man in the Mirror; Understanding Power and Influence in Public Diplomacy, Forthcoming)  
(Fisher, Mapping The Great Beyond; Identifying Meaningful Networks in Public Diplomacy, 2010 (Forthcoming))
- xxii (Price, Changing International Broadcasting in the Obama Era?, 2008)
- xxiii (Glassman, 2008)

- 
- xxiv (Zaharna, 2007)
- (Arsenault, 2008)
- xxv (Arsenault, 2008)
- (Hocking, 2008)
- xxvi Although using Statecraft, successful statecraft relies on diplomats working outside the usual diplomatic channels and considering working with a full range of actors at home and overseas.
- xxvii (Lord, 2008) p. 13
- xxviii (Singer H. A., 2008)
- xxix (Gowing, 2009) p. 78
- xxx (Steven & Evans, 2008)
- xxxi (Ostrom, *Governing the Commons; The evolution of institutions for collective action*, 1990) p. 5
- xxxii (Ostrom, *Governing the Commons; The evolution of institutions for collective action*, 1990) pp. 6-7
- xxxiii (Richard Armitage, 2007) p. 6
- xxxiv (Karl, 1997)
- This provides useful insight into why in “the midst of two massive oil booms in the 1970s, oil-exporting governments as different as Venezuela, Iran, Nigeria, Algeria, and Indonesia chose common development paths and suffered similarly disappointing outcomes”.
- xxxv Constructions which privilege individual over collective benefit include the Realist contention that anarchy makes security the primary priority of states and leads Barry Posen to argue “it can be otherwise only if these political organizations do not care about their survival as independent entities”. As a result, “there will be competition for the key to security – power”.<sup>9</sup> The competition between nations leads in these realist arguments to a Security Dilemma and an interpretation of the world places the benefit of the individual state over the collective. As Andrew Kydd puts it; “The most loyal Hobbesians argue that there is an irreducible level of mistrust between states that prevents cooperation”.<sup>10</sup> John Mearsheimer’s words emphasise the distinction between the collective and competitive approaches; there is “little room for trust amongst states. Although the level of fear varies across time and space, it can never be reduced to a trivial level”.
- (Kydd, 2005)
- (Mearsheimer, 2001)
- xxxvi (Kydd, 2005) p. 123
- xxxvii While the War of Ideas emphasises the importance of debate and exchange of ideas, it is promoted concomitant with promoting American leadership, reducing the potential for genuine exchange and engagement.
- xxxviii These are not the only two options but provide the concepts most likely to provide insight for Public Diplomacy.
- xxxix (Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, *Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources*, 1994) p. 7
- xl (Ostrom, *Governing the Commons; The evolution of institutions for collective action*, 1990) p. 31
- xli (Fisher, *Music for the Jilted Generation; Open Source Public Diplomacy*, 2008)
- xlii (Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, *Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources*, 1994)
- xliiii (Benkler, 2008) p. 11
- xliiv (Mehra, 2009)
- xli v (Mehra, 2009)
- xli vi (Anholt, 2008)
- (Richard Armitage, 2007)
- xli vii (Anholt, 2008) p.
- xli viii (Buncombe, 2005)
- xli ix (Anholt, 2008) p. 36
- l (Anholt, 2008) p. 37
- li (Copeland, *Guerrilla Diplomacy*, 2009) p. 174
- lii (Anholt, 2008)
- liii (Anholt, 2008)
- li v (Anholt, 2008)
- li vi (Anholt, 2008)
- li vii (Bröckerhoff, 2008) p. 23
- li viii (Bröckerhoff, 2008) p. 23
- li ix (Richard Armitage, 2007) p. 5
- lix (Nye, *Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power*, 2003)
- lx (Fisher, *Music for the Jilted Generation; Open Source Public Diplomacy*, 2008) p. 3

- 
- lxi (Allison, 2008) p. 108
- lxii (Copeland, *Diplomatic Surge? Part III – The dilemma of smart power*, 2009)
- lxiii The discussion of Persuasion + Coercion as the combination for hegemony provides a similar construction, though this is disputed by Joseph Nye. Of particular use is the discussion by Gramsci of the way historic bloc are created. This is often overlooked as his work is often only considered as discussing the position of the hegemon. However, as he was discussing approaches to change the political system the *Prison Notebooks* not only analyse the hegemon which had to be removed but also how other groups (historic blocs) might rise in their place. One without the other would not be able to cause a change in the political system and it is this which Nye overlooks. For further discussion of this use of Gramsci see:  
(Fisher, *Changing the Odds: The State-Private network and the development of American Studies in Europe*, 2005)  
Recent comments on Gramsci and Hegemony see:  
(Nye, *Joseph Nye: Soft Power and Public Diplomacy - British Council Parliamentary Lecture*, 2010)
- lxiv (Cull, 2009)
- lxv
- lxvi (Zaharna, 2007)  
(Hocking, 2008)  
(Gregory, 2009)
- lxvii (Jorgensen, 2009)  
(Gouveia, 2005)
- lxviii (Copeland, *Guerrilla Diplomacy*, 2009)
- lxix (Shirky, 2008)  
(Price, Haas, & Margolin, *New Technologies and International Broadcasting: Reflections on Adaptations and Transformations*, 2008)  
(Gregory, 2009)
- lxx See discussion of many to many in Appendix 2.0
- lxxi For further discussion of network mapping in Public Diplomacy (Fisher, *Mapping The Great Beyond; Identifying Meaningful Networks in Public Diplomacy*, 2010 (Forthcoming))
- lxxii (Fisher, *The Iranian Election: Following a Conversation*, 2009)
- lxxiii (Fisher, *Bullets with Butterfly Wings; Tweets, Protest Networks and the Iranian Election*, (Forthcoming))
- lxxiv (Trace Encounters, 2004)
- lxxv (Fisher, *Mapping The Great Beyond; Identifying Meaningful Networks in Public Diplomacy*, 2010 (Forthcoming))
- lxxvi (Cull, 2009)
- lxxvii (Bohnet & Frey, 1999)
- lxxviii Clearly some countries will be affected more than others by climate change – I merely argue those that do restrict emissions will not receive local benefit from that action if total global emissions reach the levels causing increasing levels of climate change.
- lxxix (Benkler, 2008) p. 15
- lxxx (Benkler, 2008) p. 15
- lxxxi (Ozernoy, 2006)
- lxxxii (Ostrom, *Governing the Commons; The evolution of institutions for collective action*, 1990) p. 33
- lxxxiii (Camerer & Fehr, 2004)
- lxxxiv (Benkler, 2008) p. 15
- lxxxv (Solnick, 2007)  
(Fenwick, Edwards, & Buckley, 2003)  
(Camerer & Fehr, 2004)
- lxxxvi (Henrich, et al., 2005)
- lxxxvii (Han & Northoff, 2008)
- lxxxviii (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005)
- lxxxix (Lee, 2008)
- xc (Ostrom, *Governing the Commons; The evolution of institutions for collective action*, 1990)  
For discussion of virtual benefit see:  
(Castronova & Fairfield, *Dragon Kill Points: A Summary White Paper*, 2007)
- lxxci (Singer, Seymour, O'Doherty, Stephan, Dolan, & Frith, 2006)  
Also see: (Seymour, Singer, & Dolan, 2007)

- 
- xcii (Blomquist, Schlager, Tang, & Ostrom, 1994) p. 305
- xciii (Blomquist, Schlager, Tang, & Ostrom, 1994) p. 305
- xciv (Benkler, 2008)
- xcv (Ostrom, *Governing the Commons; The evolution of institutions for collective action*, 1990) p. 23
- xcvi J Elster quoted in: (Ostrom, *Governing the Commons; The evolution of institutions for collective action*, 1990) p. 95
- xcvii (Ostrom, *Governing the Commons; The evolution of institutions for collective action*, 1990) pp. 94-100
- xcviii (Ostrom, *Governing the Commons; The evolution of institutions for collective action*, 1990) p. 6
- xcix As an interesting aside, [Stephen Hale](#), (Head of Engagement, Digital Diplomacy, FCO) wrote in response;  
 “Corporate Twitter channels are fine, but I think it's more interesting to see how individuals ([like John Duncan](#)) are embracing the medium for their own benefit, using Twitter to engage in conversations with niche communities of interest”. All despite the FCO having vastly more corporate channels than the ‘more interesting’ use by individuals.
- c (Fisher, *Looking at the Man in the Mirror; Understanding Power and Influence in Public Diplomacy*, Forthcoming)
- ci (Australian Government taskforce on Gov2.0, 2010) p. 69
- cii (Benkler 2008)
- ciii 'Commentary', *Monthly Review of the British Council*, 1:1, June 1947 quoted in;  
 (Fisher, *Looking at the Man in the Mirror; Understanding Power and Influence in Public Diplomacy*, Forthcoming)
- civ (Lavrov, 2006)
- cv (Ostrom, *Crowding out Citizenship*, 2000)
- cvi (Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, *Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources*, 1994) p. 329
- cvi (Metzl, 2001)
- cviii (Lugar, 2010)
- cix (Lugar, 2010)
- cx (Benkler, 2008) p. 8
- cx (McHale, 2009)
- cxii (Potter, 2008)
- cxiii (Brown, 2009)
- cxiv For a discussion of understanding and investigation coordination see (Castronova, *On the Research Value of Large Games: Natural Experiments in Norrath and Camelot*, 2005)

#### Bibliography

- "X Factor" winner faces Xmas No.1 battle. (2009, December 15). Retrieved January 2010, from Reuters: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE5BC1PB20091215>
- Allison, A. (2008). The Attractions of the J-wave for American Youth. In W. Yasushi, & D. L. McConnell, *Soft Power Super Powers; Cultural and national assets of Japan and the United States* (pp. 99-110). London: M.E.Sharpe.
- Anholt, S. (2008). The Importance of National Reputation. In J. Murphy, *Engagement; Public Diplomacy in a Globalised World* (pp. 30-43). London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
- Arsenault, G. C. (2008). Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 10-30.
- Australian Government taskforce on Gov2.0. (2010). *Engage*. Government Report.
- Benkler, Y. (2008). Law, Policy and Cooperation. *Government and Markets: Toward a new theory of regulation*, (pp. 1-34).

---

Blomquist, W., Schlager, E., Tang, S. Y., & Ostrom, E. (1994). Regularities from the Field and Possible Explanations. In E. Ostrom, R. Gardener, & J. Walker, *Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources* (pp. 301-318). Michigan: The University of Michigan Press.

Bohnet, I., & Frey, B. (1999). The sound of silence in prisoner's dilemma and dictator games. *Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization* , 43-57.

Bröckerhoff, A. F. (2008). *Options For Influence*. London: Counterpoint.

Brown, J. (2009, July 23). *A Forgotten Kitchen Debate and American Public Diplomacy*. Retrieved January 2010, from The Huffington Post: [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-brown/a-forgotten-kitchen-debat\\_b\\_244056.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-brown/a-forgotten-kitchen-debat_b_244056.html)

Buncombe, A. (2005, March 31). *Canadian waters stained red by baby seal cull*. Retrieved January 2010, from The Independent: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/canadian-waters-stained-red-by-baby-seal-cull-530588.html>

Camerer, C. F., & Fehr, E. (2004). Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists. In J. Henrich, E. Fehr, & H. Gintis, *Foundations of Human Sociality – Experimental and Ethnographic Evidence from 15 Small-Scale Societies* (pp. 55-95). USA: Oxford University Press.

Castronova, E. (2005, December). *On the Research Value of Large Games: Natural Experiments in Norrath and Camelot* . Retrieved December 11, 2009, from CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1621: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=875571>

Castronova, E., & Fairfield, J. (2007). *Dragon Kill Points: A Summary White Paper*. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=958945>.

Clinton, H. (2010, January 21). *Remarks on Internet Freedom*. Retrieved January 2010, from State.Gov: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm>

Copeland, D. (2009, February 28). *Diplomatic Surge? Part III – The dilemma of smart power*. Retrieved January 2010, from Guerrilla Diplomacy: <http://www.guerrilladiplomacy.com/2009/02/diplomatic-surge-part-iii—the-dilemma-of-smart-power/>

Copeland, D. (2009). *Guerrilla Diplomacy*. Lynne Rienner Publishing : London.

Cull, N. (2009, October). *Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past*. Retrieved from CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy: <http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/publications/perspectives/CPDPerspectivesLessons.pdf>

Delgado, M. R., Frank, R. H., & Phelps, E. A. (2005). Perceptions of moral character modulate the neural systems of reward during the trust game. *Nature Neuroscience* , 1611-1618.

Fenwick, M., Edwards, R., & Buckley, P. J. (2003). Is Cultural Similarity Misleading? Experience of Australian manufacturers in Britain. *International Business Review* , 297-309.

Fisher, A. ((Forthcoming)). Bullets with Butterfly Wings; Tweets, Protest Networks and the Iranian Election. In Y. Kamalipour, *Media, Power, and Politics in the Digital Age*.

- 
- Fisher, A. (2005). *Changing the Odds; The State-Private network and the development of American Studies in Europe*. University of Birmingham: PhD Thesis.
- Fisher, A. (2009). Four Seasons in One Day: The Crowded House of UK Public Diplomacy. In N. Snow, & P. Taylor, *Routledge handbook of public diplomacy* (pp. 251-261). New York: Routledge.
- Fisher, A. (Forthcoming). Looking at the Man in the Mirror; Understanding Power and Influence in Public Diplomacy. In A. Fisher, & S. Lucas, *Trials of Engagement*.
- Fisher, A. (2010 (Forthcoming)). *Mapping The Great Beyond; Identifying Meaningful Networks in Public Diplomacy*. University of Southern California (CPD).
- Fisher, A. (2008). Music for the Jilted Generation; Open Source Public Diplomacy. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* , 1-24.
- Fisher, A. (2009, October 6). *The Iranian Election: Following a Conversation*. Retrieved January 2010, from CPD Blog:  
[http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog\\_detail/the\\_iranian\\_election\\_following\\_a\\_conversation/](http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_detail/the_iranian_election_following_a_conversation/)
- Gilboa, E. (2008). Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* , 55-58.
- Gilboa, E. (2008). Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* , 55-77.
- Glassman, J. (2008, December 1). *Public Diplomacy 2.0: A New Approach to Global Engagement*. Retrieved January 2010, from Mountainrunner.us:  
<http://mountainrunner.us/library/publicdiplomacy/publicdiplomacy20.html>
- Gouveia, P. F. (2005). *European Infopolitik - Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy*. London: The Foreign Policy Centre.
- Gowing, N. (2009). *Skyful of lies and Black Swans; The new tyranny of shifting information power in crises*. Oxford: RISJ Challenges.
- Gregory, B. (2009, October 5). *Mapping Smart Power in Multi-stakeholder Public Diplomacy / Strategic Communication*. Retrieved January 2010, from Mountainrunner.us:  
[http://www.publicdiplomacycouncil.org/uploads/GW\\_IPDGC\\_\\_Smart\\_Power\\_\\_BGregory-1.pdf](http://www.publicdiplomacycouncil.org/uploads/GW_IPDGC__Smart_Power__BGregory-1.pdf)
- Han, S., & Northoff, G. (2008). Culture-sensitive neural substrates of human cognition: a transcultural neuroimaging approach. *Nature Reviews Neuroscience* , 646-654.
- Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., et al. (2005). 'Economic Man' in Cross-cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-scale Societies. *Behavioural and Brain Sciences* , 795-855.
- Hocking, B. (2008). Reconfiguring public diplomacy: from competition to collaboration. In *Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a globalised world*. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
- Jorgensen, K. E. (2009). The european union in multilateral diplomacy. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* , 189-209.

- 
- Karl, T. L. (1997). *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States*. Berkley: University of California Press.
- Kimmage, D. (2008, June 26). *Fight Terror with Youtube*. Retrieved January 2010, from New York Times: [www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/opinion/26kimmage.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/opinion/26kimmage.html)
- Kydd, A. (2005). *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lavrov, S. (2006). Diplomacy Today: Subject and Method . *International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politicis* , 1-10.
- Leadbeater, C. (n.d.). *We Think: Mass Innovation not Mass Production*. Retrieved January 2010, from We Think the book <http://www.wethinkthebook.net/home.aspx>:  
<http://www.charlesleadbeater.net/cms/xstandard/ChapterOne.pdf>
- Lee, D. (2008). Game theory and neural basis of social decision making. *Nature Neuroscience* , 404-409.
- Let's get Joe to Number 1*. (2009, December 17). Retrieved January 2010, from The X-Factor: [http://xfactor.itv.com/2009/news/viewer/item\\_100319.htm](http://xfactor.itv.com/2009/news/viewer/item_100319.htm)
- Lord, K. M. (2008). *Voices of America; U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution.
- Lugar, R. (2010, January 6). *Twitter vs. Terror*. Retrieved January 2010, from Foreign Policy: [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/06/twitter\\_vs\\_terror?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/06/twitter_vs_terror?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full)
- MacKay, A., & Tatham, S. (2009, December). Behavioural Conflict; From General to Strategic Corporal: Complexity Adaptation and Influence. *The Shrivenham Papers* .
- McHale, J. A. (2009, June 11). *Public Diplomacy: A National Security Imperative*. Retrieved January 2010, from State.gov: <http://www.state.gov/r/remarks/124640.htm>
- Mearsheimer, J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: Norton.
- Mehra, P. (2009, September 4). Comparing a country to a brand is only a metaphor. *Livemint.com* .
- Metzl, J. (2001). Network Diplomacy. *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* .
- Nye, J. (2010, January 20). *Joseph Nye: Soft Power and Public Diplomacy - British Council Parliamentary Lecture*. Retrieved January 2010, from Britishcouncil.org: <http://www.britishcouncil.org/new/PageFiles/11706/2010%2001%2022%20Joe%20Nye%20Soft%20Power.pdf>
- Nye, J. (2003, January 10). Propaganda Isn't the Way: Soft Power. *International Herald Tribune* .
- Ostrom, E. (2000). Crowding out Citizenship. *Scandinavian Political Studies* , 3-16.
- Ostrom, E. (1990). *Governing the Commons; The evolution of institutions for collective action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- 
- Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., & Walker, J. (1994). *Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources*. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press.
- Ozernoy, I. (2006, November). Ears Wide Shut. *The Atlantic* .
- Posen, B. R. (1993). The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict. *Survival* , 27-47.
- Potter, E. (2008). Web 2.0 and the new public diplomacy: impact and opportunities. In *Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a Globalised World*. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
- Price, M. (2008, November 11). *Changing International Broadcasting in the Obama Era?* Retrieved January 10, 2010, from The Huffington Post: [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/monroe-price/changing-international-br\\_b\\_143099.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/monroe-price/changing-international-br_b_143099.html)
- Price, M., Haas, S., & Margolin, D. (2008). New Technologies and International Broadcasting: Reflections on Adaptations and Transformations. *he Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* , 150-172.
- Rage beats Joe McElderry to Christmas No 1*. (2009, December 21). Retrieved January 2010, from The X-Factor: [http://xfactor.itv.com/2009/news/viewer/item\\_100320.htm](http://xfactor.itv.com/2009/news/viewer/item_100320.htm)
- Raymond, E. (1999). *The Cathedral and the Bazaar; Musings on Linux and Open Source by an accidental revolutionary*. Sebastopol: O'Reilly.
- Richard Armitage, J. N. (2007). *CSIS Commission on Smart Power; A smarter, more secure America*. Washington DC: CSIS.
- Seymour, B., Singer, T., & Dolan, R. (2007). The neurobiology of punishment. *Nature Reviews Neuroscience* , 300-311.
- Shirky, C. (2008). *Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations*. Penguin Books.
- Simon Cowell: Rage Against the Machine campaign is 'stupid'*. (2009, December 10). Retrieved January 2010, from Guardian.co.uk: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2009/dec/10/simon-cowell-rage-against-machine>
- Singer, H. A. (2008). To Win the 'War on Terror,' We Must First Win the War of Ideas; Here's How. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* .
- Singer, T., Seymour, B., O'Doherty, J. P., Stephan, K. E., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, C. D. (2006). Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others. *Nature* , 466-469.
- Solnick, S. J. (2007). Cash and alternate methods of accounting in an experimental game. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* , 316-321.
- Steven, D., & Evans, A. (2008, July). *Towards a theory of influence for twenty-first-century foreign policy*. Retrieved from Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a Globalised World: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/publications-and-documents/publications1/pd-publication/21c-foreign-policy>

---

Thompson, N. (2009, June 17). *Iran: Before you have that Twitter-Gasm...* Retrieved December 10, 2009, from Wired.com: <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/06/iran-before-you-have-that-twitter-gasm/>

*Trace Encounters*. (2004, September). Retrieved January 2010, from <http://www.traceencounters.org/>

Varnelis, K. (2010, January 14). *The meaning of Network Culture*. Retrieved January 2010, from Eurozine: <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2010-01-14-varnelis-en.html>

Zaharna, R. (2007). The Soft Power Differential: Network Communication and Mass Communication in Public Diplomacy. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* , 213-228.